

General Strikes and Road Transport

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GENERAL STRIKES AND ROAD TRANSPORT

BEING AN ACCOUNT OF THE ROAD TRANSPORT ORGANISATION PREPARED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO MEET NATIONAL EMERGENCIES, WITH A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ITS USE IN THE EMERGENCY OF MAY 1926.

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Geoffrey Bles



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BY
GEORGE GLASGOW

WITH A FOREWORD BY
THE RIGHT HON. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., P.C., M.P., ETC.



Geoffrey Bles Suffolk St., Pall Mall
London

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

"THE MINOANS" (an account of the Excavations

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Pall Mall, S.W.1.

The author
takes the opportunity
of expressing
his respect
for one of nature's
most gentle and most charming
of men
by dedicating
this book
to
the Right Rev.
Bishop Ridgeway, D.D.
who
in his eighty-sixth year
adds gaiety to charm
and keeps us
young.

CONTENTS

Foreword. By the Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., P.C., M.P. -	9
Introduction - - - - -	17
PART ONE : THE SCHEME IN OPERATION	
Chapter One. The Ruling Principle -	29
„ Two The Problem in London -	34
„ Three. Some Typical Preparatory Work - - - -	55
„ Four. A Rural Division - - -	60
„ Five. Scotland - - - -	64
„ Six. The North-Western Division - - - -	68
„ Seven. Haulage and Road Transport - - - -	82
„ Eight. Petroleum - - - -	94
Epitaph - - - - -	97

PART TWO : OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Chapter One. Decentralisation	- -	101
„ Two. The Emergency Regulations		115
Appendix. List of Civil Commissioners, Staffs and Office Addresses - - -		137
Maps : (1) England and Wales, showing Emergency Divisions		
(2) The London Division		
(3) The Eastern Division		
(4) The North-Western Division		

FOREWORD

WE have become accustomed to living on the edge of a precipice. Now that we have been over—as we were in the first fortnight of May, 1926—it may be expected that the precipice will be taken more seriously in the future. Probably ninety-nine out of every hundred people in this country imagined in May, when the Trade Union Congress suddenly put a stop to railways, tubes, omnibuses, taxis, newspapers, and attempted to dislocate the entire organisation of industrial enterprise, that somehow or other the Government of the day improvised a system of haphazard transport by road which somehow or other succeeded in distributing milk, potatoes, flour, meat, eggs, petrol, and other essential things. Most people knew that there was a Milk Pool in Hyde Park, that convoys surmounted with tin hats plied between the London Docks and Hyde Park, but they no doubt assumed that the rest of the business was carried on by Tom, Dick and Harry who volunteered for service

with their private two-seaters or other four-wheeled luxuries which were capable of being turned to essential use. The emergency arrangements were not, of course, anything so haphazard.

The emergency organisation which is kept in permanent readiness for use in the contingency of a national stoppage is the result of a gradual evolution. It has resulted from several years of thought and work. Its exact nature has been something of a secret, and at first thought it might be wondered if Mr. George Glasgow has done a wise thing in making it public. It is my opinion that a general recognition of the decisive efficacy of road transport for the purposes of feeding the nation in a sudden emergency will do good.

Certainly the Trade Union Congress was surprised at the success with which the roads did their work. Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children can drive cars. Road transport has developed so gradually but so quickly that few of us were prepared for so complete an illustration of its power as we have now had.

Yet the Trade Union Congress was aware, or ought to have been aware of the Government's scheme of transport by road. The scheme has been in continuous readiness since the war. The

Coalition Government of 1919 not only made the scheme, but used it. It was put into operation to prevent the railway strike of 1919 from starving the nation. Since then it has been handed down from Government to Government and progressively improved. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his Ministry not only took it over, but were ready and even anxious to make use of it, as the author records, in the two threatened emergencies of 1924.

Even before the end of the war preparations were being made by my Cabinet to meet any industrial crisis which would involve interference with the transport and food supplies of the country.

After the Armistice a very complete organisation was created by the Ministry of Food, at my desire, for that purpose.

At that time the vast machinery of food control was still in existence, and, utilising in part the existing machinery, arrangements were made to divide the country into sixteen divisional areas, each with its own commissioner and staff, ready to act at a moment's notice, in the event of a transport, or general, strike.

The "Powers of the Food Controller Road

Transport (Requisition) Order of 1919" gave the Food Controller for the time being, on a state of emergency being declared, ample powers of requisitioning motor and other vehicles, and a complete system of road transport was organised.

Retailers throughout the country were encouraged to hold reserve stocks of food, and in addition depôts of emergency stocks were created and placed under the control of the district commissioners.

Full and detailed particulars of the transport and drivers whose services would be available were registered by the Ministry of Food, and if a general strike came, the sending of a one-word code telegram to sixteen district commissioners was all that was necessary to set the whole machinery in motion.

On September 26th, 1919, these preparations were tested by the railway strike, which commenced on that date and lasted until October 6th.

The Strike Emergency Committee, under Mr. G. H. Roberts and Mr. McCurdy, sat at the Ministry of Food from day to day to deal, not merely with the acute transport problem caused by the stoppage on the railways, but to have everything ready for the public safety in case the railway strike should be extended to a strike of the Triple Alliance or a general strike.

Hyde Park was taken over as a transport centre. Twenty-five thousand lorries and other motor vehicles were requisitioned. The machinery, once started, gathered momentum from hour to hour.

Within forty-eight hours the food position was secure, on 75,000 miles of road the improvised transport system was working smoothly, and London was receiving 60, 70 and then 75 per cent. of its normal milk supplies.

To ensure bread supplies in different parts of the country the assistance of the Admiralty was obtained for the distribution of yeast by ship to selected ports, thence to be transferred by motor to the urban centres.

At the end of the strike the stocks of food throughout the country were practically normal.

In 1921 the Coalition Government was again faced with the same problems. On March 31st the great coal stoppage of that year commenced. The Ministry of Food had just been disbanded and Sir Eric Geddes, Minister of Transport, was asked by me to control the Strike Emergency Organisation with the assistance of a committee of which Mr. McCurdy, the late Food Controller, and the principal officials of the late Ministry of Food, were members.

On April 8th the Army Reserves were called out and a National Defence Force was formed, and on the same day the Triple Alliance called for a general strike for April 12th. Again the Government Emergency Committee, in continuous session, took the necessary measures to protect the nation, and on April 12th the knowledge that the Government was again fully prepared to meet the menace of a general strike was perhaps a not unimportant reason why the general strike was called off.

The conditions ruling in 1926 were, however, different from those of 1919. The author makes a detailed comparison of those differences, the chief of them being that in 1919 the Government was still in control of food supplies, and had other advantages bequeathed by the war, which enabled us to organise both food and transport as Government concerns, whereas in 1926 the Ministry of Transport had to work through the Trade. The great innovation of the 1926 organisation was the use of voluntary Haulage Committees carrying out the Ministry of Transport's plan as part of their existing commercial business.

Mr. Glasgow, rightly, I think, claims that the experience of Great Britain in May, 1926, has

established a new truth in political philosophy, namely, that road transport can be relied on to serve the immediate vital needs of a country in a sudden emergency of short duration. Such a truth in no way affects the more permanent value of the railways as the simplest and cheapest means of transport, or as the only means of transport for big haulage such as heavy machinery.

This record of Great Britain's actual experience in 1926 has something in it of close interest to all who are seriously concerned about modern industrial disputes, not only in Great Britain, but in other countries which have had or may have to face similar emergencies.

Strikes and lockouts as means of settling industrial disputes are methods of barbarism. But until more civilised methods have been found and accepted the "non-combatants" in the community must be safeguarded against privation. In organising such protection Governments express no opinion on the merits of a dispute. They are simply performing the elementary functions of good government.

D. LLOYD GEORGE.

August 11th, 1926.

INTRODUCTION

THE smoothness and efficiency with which the British Civil Service, helped by various voluntary organisations, maintained the country's vital services when the General Council of the Trade Union Congress waged a semi-general strike in May, 1926, is now a matter of historical commonplace. Several countries in the world have had contemporary experience of revolutions and strikes, general or partial. The experience of Great Britain has added something new and something important to the sum total of the world's experience in this field. It is not only, or even mainly, that in Great Britain the shock was effectively withstood ; that the concerted and simultaneous withdrawal of organised labour from the entire transport system of the country failed of its paralysing purpose. The important thing is that an emergency organisation of transport by road was tested and proved to be adequate to the essential needs of communal life. That is a new fact in history, as the political philosophers have been quick to recognise. The

precedent of the British Strike of May, 1926, will no doubt be the subject of study during many years ahead. Its lessons are likely to have their effect on the internal affairs of many countries.

There is, therefore, something to be gained by putting down in the form of a comprehensive record the exact nature of the organisation so successfully put to the test by the British Civil Service. It contains facts which will necessarily modify the former theories of organised transport. The new truth which it contributes to modern life, namely the decisive efficacy of transport by road, implies the further truth that the railways can no longer be regarded as one of the indispensable services, at any rate for the immediate vital needs of the country. Whether the railways' existing supremacy in the service of big haulage for industrial purposes, such as the transport of heavy machinery, can ever be affected by the evolution of road transport is another question. That question is not raised by the issue of a sudden and general dislocation, whether attempted for the object of constitutional or of merely industrial revolution. The real point at issue is whether the trade unions by a sudden strike in the key services can bring the nation to its knees and impose their terms. Road transport

has proved that such a thing is next to impossible.

What is not generally appreciated perhaps is that ever since the war the Government has had in continuous readiness an emergency organisation of road transport for the distribution of food against the contingency of a general transport strike. The contingency of May, 1926, was the first emergency on the complete scale, and therefore provided the first complete test of the emergency organisation ; but the organisation itself was not only in existence in former years, but was used and tested in the partial emergency of 1919. It is indeed one of the conditions of modern civilised life, at any rate of British civilised life, that the Government has to maintain an emergency organisation in permanent being. Although it is an emergency organisation, it is not a mushroom phenomenon. It has become a regular feature of Government administration, and the Labour Party, for instance, knows all about it.

In 1919, when the Railway Strike threatened to put the country out of gear, the organisation was used in its original form by Mr. Lloyd George's Government. It is to that Government that the genesis of the plan has to be ascribed. The

conditions then were different. "Dora" was still operative; the Government still retained its war-time control of food supplies, still had at its disposal its own supplies of flour, meat, bacon and other essential commodities; food was rationed; the needs of the country in its various areas were known with arithmetical accuracy; the Ministry of Food had not yet been abolished, and its 11,000 officials, all of them familiar with the business of food distribution, were still at the Government's disposal. Moreover, in 1919 there was an abundant supply of lorries and other vehicles, which were then being demobilised from army use both abroad and at home. There was, too, an abundance of trained lorry drivers, made available by the same process of demobilisation, and not yet absorbed into industry. They were excellent lorry drivers, having been trained in the efficient school of the R.A.S.C. In 1919 the Lloyd George Organisation worked on the principle of Government requisitioning of vehicles, a principle automatically suggested by the ready-made facilities for its application. In the case of 1919 the Ministry of Food was in charge of both branches of the organisation, that of transport and that of supply, an arrangement which had its advantages

at that time, although it would not have served the different conditions of 1926. Hence it was that, in advance of the 1919 emergency, reserve stocks of flour and other key foods were accumulated in what may be called strategic positions. Those reserve foods, with their accommodation and loss or depreciation, cost the Government some £160,000, the total cost of the organisation being a little over £500,000.

Essentially the same organisation was in readiness for the threatened Triple Alliance Strike of 1921, which did not materialise. When the Lloyd George Government resigned in 1922, the Bonar Law Government took over the existing organisation, merely substituting its own Civil Commissioners. The officials of the Road Transport Board, being permanent officials, remained at their posts, but the Civil Commissioners, whose appointment is necessarily political in kind, had to be changed. Similarly, when the MacDonald Ministry assumed office in January, 1924, new Commissioners were appointed, but the old organisation maintained. Not only was the emergency organisation in being during the Labour Ministry's period of office, but neither the Coalition Ministry nor the two Conservative Ministries had been more

wholehearted in their reliance on it than were Mr. MacDonald and his colleagues when the two strike dangers emerged in 1924.

The emergency organisation, therefore, became a continuous routine in Government administration. It is true that when the Ministry of Food was disbanded, and transferred as the Food Department to the Board of Trade, there was a short period when its continuity seemed to be in jeopardy. The emergency of 1919 had passed, and no serious new danger had emerged. Those Civil Servants, however, who had had to do with the 1919 organisation, who knew both the dangers and the difficulty of meeting them, and who therefore were somewhat concerned about the thinness of the ice, effectively used their influence, and something more permanent was created. At one time in 1920 a scheme was worked out for the permanent establishment of an emergency organisation at a cost of some £15,000 a year to the Government. Grotesque as it may appear, the scheme was rejected by the Government on the ground of expense, and still more grotesque as it may appear, the thin threads of the organisation were kept intact by two permanent officials and a clerk, and in 1922, for instance, the entire expense to the Government was £1,050.

Two main facts differentiate the emergency of 1926 from that of 1919. In 1926 the strike was not merely a railway strike, nor merely a strike of the Triple Alliance. It was an attempt to paralyse the vital services by a so-called "General Strike." In the second place, the conditions which in 1919 had helped the Government to control the vital services, no longer held good in 1926. Whatever demobilisation there had been of army lorries had taken place long before 1926, and most of the R.A.S.C. drivers had been absorbed in industry. The Ministry of Food was no longer in existence. The 1926 organisation therefore had to adopt new expedients, of which the chief was that of voluntary haulage. In May, 1926, no attempt was made to requisition vehicles. Instead, the hauliers of the country were organised on a voluntary basis, and the entire transport of the country was carried out by 150 haulage committees, recruited from working hauliers. One incidental result was that during the strike of May, 1926, the entire road transport of the country was carried on without any appreciable direct expense to the Government. The actual cost of the transport organisation in England and Wales was given in a Supplementary

Estimate issued on July 5th as £20,000—a mere nothing.*

The emergency organisation of road transport is therefore the result of a continuous evolution, which started with Mr. Lloyd George's Government just after the war. In the following pages I describe the organisation in detail, as perfected and put to the test by the British Ministry of Transport in the emergency of May, 1926, analyse the hypotheses on which it was based and record its practical experience. I have invited Mr. Lloyd George, as the father of the original scheme, to write a Foreword to the volume, and he has courteously accepted my invitation.

I have been helped by many of those who were concerned in the preparation and in the execution of the scheme, and am indebted to the Lord

* The full estimate for the whole direct cost to the Government of the General Strike was given on July 5th thus :

	£
Civil Commissioner Organisation and miscellaneous services - - - - -	78,000
Food organisations (England and Wales) (net) - - - - -	119,000
Transport organisations (England and Wales) - - - - -	20,000
Coal organisations - - - - -	35,000
<i>British Gazette</i> (net) - - - - -	16,000
Civil Constabulary Reserve - - - - -	65,000
Grants in respect of police expenditure - - - - -	100,000
Total - - - - -	£433,000

Advocate of Scotland, the Right Hon. William Watson, K.C., who was Minister in Charge of the Scottish Office Emergency Head-quarters ; to Major Sir Philip Sassoon, Bart., G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P., who was Civil Commissioner of the Eastern Division ; and to Major G. Hennessy, O.B.E., M.P., Civil Commissioner of the North-Western Division, for evidence of its actual operation in typical Divisions. No one but the author, however, must be held responsible for anything that appears in the book.


GEORGE GLASGOW.

London,
1926.

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PART ONE : THE SCHEME IN
OPERATION



THE kernel of the problem was road transport. Food is useless unless it can be distributed. Widespread distress results unless it is distributed quickly, abundantly and without hitch. Foreign observers who have had some experience of national emergencies have confessed to curiosity about the secret of the organisation which was hatched and successfully put into practice by the Ministry of Transport. By the eleventh day of the strike in May, 1926, that organisation was so far advanced and running so smoothly that economists were beginning to speculate about the chances of an economic revolution, whereby the services of the middlemen might in the future be completely dispensed with, as a result of the impressive object lesson given by the Government in the efficacy of central distribution.

What was the secret? In the first place the whole organisation had been thought out in every detail long before the emergency arose. Not only had the country been divided up into Divisions, the duties of Civil Commissioners, Food and Road

Commissioners, and of Haulage Committees reduced to a practical routine, but the chief executive officials had met, had co-ordinated and decentralised their functions, anticipated emergencies and perfected their plans to such a point that when the strike came there was hardly a single hitch of organisation anywhere. Secondly—and this will be the chief source of surprise to foreign experts—the haulage system was based on a new and, in prospect, a risky principle. In the event, however, the Ministry of Transport's boldness in adopting it was abundantly justified. Instead of requisitioning lorries and other vehicles, and attempting to run them as a Government concern, the authorities decided to continue the entire transport traffic of the country on the existing commercial lines. Haulage contractors continued to carry goods as their normal business, to employ their own labour, and to charge commercial rates. One result was that the consumer, not the Government, paid for it. When the price of milk went up by 2d. a quart, for instance, at the beginning of the strike, the increase was an indirect method of paying for transport.

The Ministry of Transport was prepared, if that system had failed, to resort to the requisitioning of vehicles, but the need did not arise. All that was

necessary was for haulage contractors to be legally exempted from their existing contracts, and to be subjected to a legal priority for the carrying of food. That is to say, wherever there was food to be transported, hauliers were legally bound to carry it; failing any food for transportation, they carried whatever they wanted to carry. In that way the commercial interest of the hauliers throughout the country was made to coincide with the needs of the Ministry of Transport. If a particular haulier could not get a driver, a volunteer was supplied by the Government organisation, and the volunteer thereupon became a regular commercial employee, responsible, not to the Government, but to the haulier. The only way in which the Government was involved in expense thereby was that a volunteer reserve of drivers had to be maintained and trained. The London training centre was Hyde Park. The cost of any particular volunteer was, however, eliminated the moment he was drafted to a job.

The general scheme was simple. All the chief printed matter, priority orders, instructions, and the like had been prepared and circulated long in advance. There were ten regional "emergency" divisions in England and Wales, and in each of them the Minister of Transport appointed a Road

Commissioner. Nine of them were engineers on the staff of the Department. The tenth was an eminent county surveyor, whose services were placed at the disposal of the Minister by the County Council concerned. Responsible to those Commissioners were some 150 Road Officers, stationed at the selected local centres in each division. Those Road Commissioners and Road Officers were the Minister's local representatives, fully competent to act on his behalf.

In each of the 150 centres the Minister appointed the Chairman of a Haulage Committee, the members of which consisted of men prominently connected with transport undertakings in their respective districts. Their duty, in its essence, was to execute the general scheme by diverting all transport from non-essential to essential purposes. The principle of the Haulage Committees was perhaps the greatest single discovery in the whole organisation.

How then did the scheme work? On the first day there was little general movement of road transport, the shock of the general stoppage and the mere physical process of so vast a change in the whole country's organisation taking time to be effected, but the Government was secure in the

knowledge that there was a week's supply of food in hand before the strike began. On the second day there was an intensive process of stocktaking and preparation for movement; on the third day the vast new machine of transport began to function, the Road Commissioners, local Road Officers, and the various Haulage Committees having put into operation the complete organisation. At the end of the first week of the strike there was a regular and orderly system of road transport throughout the country equal to the physical needs of the population. One of the great lessons resulting from the strike is that in an emergency road transport in its modern development can supply all immediate needs, and it cannot be controlled by trade unionism.

The docks presented a separate problem which will be clarified in the following pages. Conditions varied, but in London, Liverpool, South Wales, Bristol, Plymouth, Southampton, Ipswich, King's Lynn, Hull, and at other important centres the problem of the docks was solved.

THE main principles on which the London Division was organised were identical with those of the other nine divisions into which the country was partitioned. London, however, had its own peculiar problems, due mainly to the vast population and to the concentration within it of political and emotional head-quarters.

§ 1. Food Distribution.

The main secret of the successful food distribution in London lay in the excellence of the personnel and organisation of the London Division Haulage Committee. Its chairman was Sir Henry Maybury, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.Inst.C.E., the distinguished engineer, Director-General of Roads in the Ministry of Transport, who had at his disposal, as his right-hand man, another permanent official of the Ministry of Transport, Mr. H. H. Piggott, C.B., C.B.E. The other members of the committee consisted of business men who were experts in a particular line of London distribution. Each of them had a further organisation of his own. There

was, for instance, Major E. G. Monro, of Covent Garden, who was particularly concerned with fruit and vegetables. He in his turn was the chairman of a sub-committee at Covent Garden which constituted the central machinery for the transport of fruit and vegetables. There were, again, further branch committees at each of the chief London markets, Brentford, Spitalfields, Borough, Stratford, King's Cross, St. Pancras, each of which delegated a member to the central committee at Covent Garden. The Covent Garden committee itself had a small executive committee which sat continuously. Each of the branch markets reported to the Covent Garden committee its requirements early every morning and indicated what haulage it had at its disposal. The Covent Garden committee thereupon co-ordinated the various requirements and put the branches into touch with available hauliers. Benefiting by a former experience, it assumed full control over distribution. When the Covent Garden porters struck in 1920 a system of decentralised control among the various markets was adopted, but it led to abuses, whereby the better organised markets obtained the lion's share of the supplies. In 1926, therefore, the control was severely centralised. Major Monro himself

attended the meetings of the London Haulage Committee, held daily at 10.30 a.m. He reported progress and arranged ahead for fruit and vegetable transport if and where wanted. Those meetings were held regularly from Monday, May 3rd, the day before the strike, till Friday, May 14th, two days after the formal end of the strike, a final meeting on the following Monday, May 17th, being held to wind up the business.

Another member of the Haulage Committee was Mr. H. Gaunt, of Messrs. Lyons, the well-known caterers, who similarly had behind him his own committee operating from Cadby Hall. He was responsible for the local distribution of foodstuffs. Food distribution in London was a problem of some magnitude, and many experts discovered for the first time in their lives how big, for instance, the potato looms in civilised life. Everybody eats potatoes, except middle-aged people who have been encouraged by their doctor to regret the vanishing lines of their youth. Potatoes are big in bulk, and heavy in weight. The experience of the strike in London was that the cartage of potatoes was by far the biggest single burden placed on transport. Lyons normally distribute 500 tons of potatoes a week in London alone.

The other members of the Haulage Committee were similarly recruited from the trade in particular commodities : Mr. James Paterson, for instance, of Messrs. Carter Paterson, for provisions and groceries ; Mr. Cecil Rickett, for coal ; Mr. Rudd, a well-known meat haulier, for the docks and markets. A Ministry of Transport official, Mr. T. L. Paterson, acted as general secretary to the committee. The full list of the London Division Haulage Committee was as follows:—

Chairman : Sir Henry Maybury, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.Inst.C.E., Ministry of Transport, 7, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1, assisted by Mr. H. H. Piggott, C.B., C.B.E., Ministry of Transport.

Wheat and Flour : Mr. W. Cotter, of Messrs. Simmons & Cotter, Ltd., 13 and 15, Great Garden Street, Whitechapel Road, E.1.

Local Distribution : Mr. W. H. Gaunt, of Messrs. Lyons & Company, Ltd., Cadby Hall, Kensington, W.14.

Newspapers : Lt.-Col. Sir Maxwell Hicks, C.B.E., of Messrs. Maxwell Hicks & Company, 12, Grosvenor Gardens, S.W.1.

Fruit and Vegetables : Major E. G. Monroe, of

Messrs. George Monro, Ltd., 41, King Street, Covent Garden, W.C.2.

Provisions and Groceries : Mr. James Paterson, of Messrs. Carter Paterson & Co., Ltd., 128, Goswell Road, E.C.1.

Coal : Mr. Cecil Rickett, of Messrs. Rickett, Smith & Co., 52, Mark Lane, E.C.3.

Meat and Fish : Mr. E. W. Rudd, of Messrs. E. W. Rudd, Ltd., 190, Bow Common Lane, E.3.

General : Mr. W. Wolsey, of Messrs. Thomas Tillings, Ltd., 20, Victoria Street, S.W.1, and Mr. J. H. Turner, of the London Haulage and Contractors' Association.

Secretary : Mr. Thomas L. Paterson, of the Ministry of Transport.

Sir Maxwell Hicks, brother of "Jix," would have been responsible for inducing the London newspapers to pool their resources for transport and distribution, but the point did not arise.

The Road Commissioner for the London Division was Mr. C. H. Bressey, C.B.E., F.S.I., the Chief Engineer in the Roads Department of the Ministry of Transport, who was assisted by Road Officers stationed in Bethnal Green, Croydon, Greenwich, Hammersmith, Hornsey, Kingston, Leyton and

Wandsworth. Their functions were to ensure transport for all essential purposes in London. The list of essential commodities was as follows : bacon, butter and margarine, cheese, coal, flour, lard, meat, medical and surgical requisites, bread, milk, miller's offals, newspapers, petrol, sugar, tea, vegetables, wheat, yeast, and forage. Given supplies of those commodities, we can apparently live for ever. At first sight it seems odd that neither fruit nor fish was included in the list of essentials an omission which perhaps, on second thoughts, may be recognised as true to life.

The arrangements made by Sir Henry Maybury's committee and by Mr. Bressey were concerned with food only to the extent that road transport was needed for its distribution. The Milk Pool in Hyde Park was organised and managed by the Board of Trade. The Haulage Committee had to be prepared to send vehicles into the country, if no trains happened to be running. On the first morning of the strike all the milk came into London as usual by train, because enough trains for the purpose had started on their journeys before midnight—that is, before the strike began, and the drivers finished their journeys before stopping work. By the second morning the Haulage Committee

was prepared to send lorries for milk anywhere within a radius of 100 miles of London. Gradually the railways recovered to such an extent that the need for road transport for milk, except between the railway termini and Hyde Park, gradually diminished. Tuesday, May 11th, was the last day on which lorries were sent into the country for milk. On the last day of the strike (May 12th) the main-line railways ran 5,239 trains.

The milk churns called for some close organisation in the first few days of the strike. Normally they are marked with the farmer's name and address, dairymen and railways are familiar with them, and empties almost automatically return to their owners. Such return is a daily necessity. It is obvious that the same number of empties must return to the same place regularly every day if the following day's supply is to be carried. Any irregularity either in the destination of churns or in the number sent back to any given place creates immediate confusion. Such confusion was, in fact, threatened because the farmers proceeded to send as much milk as they had to London. May is normally the most prolific month for milk. Normally much of it at this time of the year is turned into cheese. In the first fortnight of May,

1926, the cheese-making was postponed, with the paradoxical effect that more milk found its way than usually finds its way into London. The effect of the strike was not a shortage, but a surplus, of milk. On the second morning of the strike, it is true, a shortage was felt owing to the inadequacy of railway transport and to the fact that road transport had not yet been fully mobilised. After the second day, however, there was no anxiety about the milk supply. It reached the normal by the seventh day, and there was a surplus on the eighth. In the last few days of the strike farmers had to be instructed to send less milk to the Hyde Park Pool. In the excitement and abnormality of the crisis some of the churns became diverted from their usual courses, and at the end of the strike a special emergency regulation was issued which was designed, with unconscious irony, to make all the prodigals return to their proper homes. That emergency regulation made it an offence for farmers to keep churns that did not belong to them. Why it should need either an emergency or an emergency regulation to make it an offence for anybody to keep other people's property is something of a conundrum. Or is emergency legislation too proud to recognise existing legislation?

§ 2. The Docks.

The London docks failed badly in the first week of the strike, and the penalty had to be paid for allowing the fatal gap to intervene on the first day. The fairest epitaph on that failure is provided by the fact that on the third day of the strike a ship-load of meat, which reached the London docks but which could not be unloaded there, was diverted to Liverpool. It was there unloaded, and the meat was transported to London, partly by road, partly by rail.

The organisation of the docks was one of the biggest elements in the London problem. It had to be solved by convoys organised from Hyde Park and operated by a force of 1,500 vehicles. Three hundred volunteer drivers were kept in reserve in Hyde Park and a school of motoring was set up to train them.

On the Thursday following the beginning of the strike the docks and wharves were dead, and the Port of London was not functioning. A shortage of flour was feared, and a crisis arose. A special Civil Commissioner, Lt.-Col. J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon, M.C., M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport, was appointed for the London Docks, and he, with a staff which included

Sir Alexander Roger as his chief assistant, established themselves at the head-quarters of the Port of London Authority. On Friday afternoon, May 7th, at 3 p.m., Sir Henry Maybury was instructed by the Cabinet to do two things: (1) to prepare a convoy of 150 vehicles, which was to leave Hyde Park for the docks under military protection at 4 a.m. on the following morning; (2) in the meantime to supply men to work at the docks and to fill the convoys. He got the labour—whence cannot be divulged in fairness to the men concerned—and transported 500 of them to the docks that same evening, completing the supply on the following day. A total of some 2,000 men passed through Hyde Park Pool for the docks and wharves.

During the night of Friday, May 7th, Hyde Park wore a grim aspect. Rain fell in torrents throughout the night, and the convoy had to leave as the dawn broke through the nightmare. There had been reports of bloodshed at the docks, of policemen killed—untrue reports, but who could know they were untrue? When tin helmets and tanks appeared on the scene as prospective escort for the convoys, cold feet became colder. By dint, however, of dragging the men out of their tents at 2 a.m. and of Herculean hustle, a convoy of 110 vehicles

left the Park at 4.35 a.m. Much to their surprise, the men had a quiet time at the docks, and returned through cheering City crowds in the afternoon. The dock problem was solved. There was no difficulty on the next and following nights, so far as the supplies were concerned. The second night the convoy numbered 267 lorries, and the difficulty now was to sift out the volunteers who wanted to take part in what became a City pageant.

There were four submarines in King George V Dock supplying electricity. After the end of the first week the docks began to function adequately. On May 9th 153 lorries, containing 6,120 bags of flour, left Victoria Docks. On May 11th 239 lorries left the same docks, loaded with 10,000 sacks of flour and 20,000 gallons of petrol. No convoy, however, at any time left or entered the Victoria Docks without military escort. On Monday, May 10th, it became possible to use other docks, without escort, and on that day, for instance, eighteen unescorted lorries went to the docks from Smithfield. An elaborate police organisation had to be set up to provide the drivers of lorries and the officers in charge of convoys with information and advice about access to the docks and wharves. Information bureaux had to be set

up at given points all round London, and the details of police stations, their addresses and telephone numbers had to be circulated to all drivers and officers.

The evacuation of the docks and of Hyde Park took place during the week-end which followed the official end of the strike. On Sunday, May 16th, every volunteer was removed by water transport from the docks, and by the following day not a lorry remained in Hyde Park.

§ 3. Passenger Traffic.

The first day of the strike in the London streets will be remembered for ever by those who experienced it. The main thoroughfares were choc-a-bloc. Every vehicle of every kind within a radius of fifty miles of London had apparently been rescued from oblivion, and for some inexplicable reason they all made their way to London. Progress along Knightsbridge, the Embankment, over the bridges, in the middle of the afternoon averaged probably a mile an hour. London was as near chaos as it has ever been, and it was saved by the very completeness of the strike. Providentially the trams were not running. If they had been running, the main outward arteries would have been inextricably jammed.

On the last day of the strike there were 1,384 buses on the London streets out of a normal of 4,404. The "independents" had been helped round a difficult corner by Sir Henry Maybury's Committee. After garaging their buses on the first night they had been unable to get them out the next morning, so effective was the picketing and peaceful intimidation carried out at all the garages. The problem was solved by a swift decision which placed Regent's Park at their disposal as a garage. Each garage was emptied under police protection and the scattered garages not used again. The drivers of the buses were supplied from Hyde Park, with the solitary exception of the owner-driver.

An interesting census which was taken of the London traffic gives a vivid impression of the effect of the strike on the streets of London. The point chosen for investigation was the Mansion House, one of the most congested crossings in London. A first census of vehicular traffic was taken on April 30th—that is, just before the strike began. A second was taken on May 11th, the day before the General Strike was called off. The results are set out here in tabular form :—

<i>Traffic proceeding from</i>	<i>Number of vehicles per hour (excluding bicycles).</i>	
	<i>Date, 30/4/26.</i>	<i>Date, 11/5/26.</i>
Princes Street - -	324	366
Threadneedle Street -	426	378
Cornhill - - -	354	246
King William Street -	402	348
Queen Victoria Street	426	489
Poultry - - -	402	336
<hr/>		
Total number of vehicles per hour - -	2,334	2,163

The hourly total of vehicles passing through the Mansion House Crossing on May 11th was, therefore, 2,163 per hour against 2,334 normally, which works out at 93 per cent. of the normal.

The constituents of the traffic were as follows :—

Light motors and motor cycles -	1,506 per hour,	69.6 %,	normally	41 %
Heavy motor lorries	210 " "	9.7 " "	" "	8.8 " "
Motor buses -	327 " "	15.1 " "	" "	34.6 " "
Horsed carts and barrows - -	120 " "	5.6 " "	" "	15.6 " "
<hr/>				
* Total - -	2,163 " "	100.0 " "	" "	100.0 " "

During the period of observation it was observed that only one vehicle ran by permission of the General Council of the Trade Union Congress.

The full record of the passenger transport in London during the strike is given in the following tables :—

NUMBER OF OMNIBUSES.

Proprietor.	Number of Omnibuses normally running.	Number of Omnibuses running.												
		4th May.	5th May.	6th May.	7th May.	8th May.	9th May (Sunday).	10th May.	11th May.	12th May.	13th May.	14th May.	15th May.	
L.G.O.C. - -	3,293	—	86	150	160	299	—	532	526	748	608	638	Normal Services running.	
M.E.T. - -	196	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
S.M.E.T. - -	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
B.A.T. - -	30	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Other Proprietors controlled by L.G.O.C. - -	89	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Tillings - -	300	—	—	12	19	20	—	27	61	91	218	319		
East Surrey - -	70	—	12	17	25	52	—	70	70	70	70	70		
Thames Valley - -	8	8	8	8	8	8	—	8	8	8	8	8		
Independents - -	415	300	300	40	150	150	—	200	294	355	351	349		
Total - -	4,404	308	406	227	362	529	—	837	959	1,272	1,255	1,384		

General Strikes and Road Transport

NUMBER OF TRAMS.

Local Authority or Company.	Maximum Number of Tramcars operated normally Monday to Friday.	Number of cars running.												
		4th May.	5th May.	6th May.	7th May.	8th May.	9th May (Sunday).	10th May.	11th May.	12th May.	13th May.	14th May.	15th May.	
L.C.C. - -	1,584	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	24	130	Normal Services running.
Croydon Corporation - -	26	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	26	
Barking U.D.C. - -	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	
East Ham Corporation - -	40	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
West Ham Corporation - -	104	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	104	
Ilford U.D.C. - -	26	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	26	
Walthamstow U.D.C. - -	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Erith U.D.C. - -	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	
Bexley and Dartford Light Railways - -	26	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
L.U.T. - -	130	—	5	4	10	20	—	20	32	56	65	66		
M.E.T. - -	250	—	4	—	7	13	—	15	33	38	48	48		
S.M.E.T. - -	30	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	9		
Total - -	2,269	—	9	4	17	33	—	35	65	94	145	427		

The Scheme in Operation

“On another:

“‘The Aerated Bus Company.’

“On a board across a broken window:

“‘Don’t dodge the conductor this way.’

“Under another such window:

“‘Emergency Exit.’

“But not all omnibuses were prepared to accept maltreatment without some resistance. One carried this warning:

“‘The driver of this bus is a Guy’s Hospital student. The conductor is a Guy’s Hospital student. The policeman is a Guy’s Hospital student. Anyone who throws a brick will soon be a Guy’s Hospital patient.’

“Nor did the pickets fail to come in for some chaff, evidently from the same source:

“‘It will never get right if you pick it.’

“While more than one omnibus displayed a much-faded funeral wreath:

“‘In Memoriam, T.U.C.’

“When the story of the great strike comes to be written, providing as it certainly does one of the most thrilling incidents in our modern history, the omnibus hilarity which cheered London to

daily laughter should receive grateful recognition.

“I am, etc.,

“GEORGE BULLOCK-WEBSTER, Rector of

“St. Michael’s, College Hill, City.

“*May 25th.*”

A park of private cars was organised on the Horse Guards Parade by Lord Curzon, M.P., and Lord Apsley, M.P. Their purpose was threefold: (1) to convey Civil Servants to and from home; (2) to convey volunteer electricians to the power-houses at short notice; (3) to distribute the *British Gazette* in the London Division. The supply of labour for the electrical power-houses was organised by the Ministry of Transport, which called on naval ratings and volunteers in about equal proportions.

Hyde Park and Regent’s Park were complete with garages, petrol dumps, canteens, tents and Red Cross stations. The British Red Cross and the Order of St. John undertook at the request of the Ministry the transport of patients to all the London hospitals. A special organisation of private cars was set up for the conveyance of medical supplies for the hospitals.

During the course of the strike a cargo of bullion reached Southampton for the Bank of England. It had come from South Africa, and being worth over £1,000,000, it could hardly be left lying about. It was brought up to London by road by four volunteer drivers, who did the journey to Southampton and back in fifteen hours, which included the time required for loading.

Chapter Three *Some Typical Preparatory Work*

MUCH of the success of the road transport organisation was due to the thoroughness with which the Ministry of Transport thought out and tested the details in advance and to the corresponding thoroughness with which the decentralised branches proceeded to master them in advance.

In an industrial provincial Division, for instance, the following preliminary work, which is here chronicled because it is typical of what was done in all the Divisions, was carried out between September, 1925, and May, 1926. The division chosen for typical analysis is referred to as "A" Division.

The Civil Commissioner and his lieutenants were appointed in September, 1925. The Road Commissioner at once went to his prospective scene of action to perfect his plans. He first concentrated on obtaining the services of local men in each of the twenty-three areas into which the Division was partitioned, those men to act (*a*) as Road Officers, (*b*) as Chairmen of Haulage Committees. Before he

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left for his head-quarters, however, some twelve volunteers had already been interviewed, and had undertaken to act as Chairmen of Haulage Committees. It therefore remained for him to organise twenty-three men as Road Officers and eleven as Chairmen of Haulage Committees. He completed that organisation by the end of November, 1925, and early in December two meetings were held, attended by all the Chairmen of Haulage Committees and by all the Road Officers of the Division. Those from the northern part of the Division met at a northern rendezvous, and those from the southern part at a southern rendezvous. As a result of those two meetings a divisional staff meeting was held at head-quarters in December, at which the Civil Commissioner was present.

It was decided at that first meeting in December that the most vital problem to be dealt with was that of road transport. The conference was held in January, 1926, and was attended by the Road Commissioner. The all-important question of protection for transport was the first to be discussed. The Road Commissioner gave it as his view that no system of convoys should be attempted in the first instance, although such a system should be held in reserve against the contingency of all other

methods failing in their object. Convoys, he held, were an unwise method of transport during a strike because they would provide a concentrated target for the attention of strikers, whereas scattered transport would be proportionately safer. If an entire convoy, for instance, were to be held up by strikers, the result might be disastrous. If an isolated vehicle in a diffused system of transport were held up, the matter would be of comparative unimportance. If, therefore, enough energy were shown by the organisers of the emergency measures in moving as much transport as possible from the very first day of the strike, it would be difficult for the strikers to co-ordinate their efforts at sabotage; and if the police were prepared to send mobile squads at a moment's notice to threatened areas, they would no doubt be able to control any situation that might arise. The eventual experience of the strike fully vindicated the plan, based on that view, which was there and then decided on.

After the transport plan had been decided on, the Road Commissioner had several interviews with the Food Officer for the Division, and drew up a map on which were shown all the main routes which would be used by food lorries. That map was

circulated through the Police Liaison Officer to all the civil constables throughout the division, and the suggestion was made that those main routes should be carefully watched, and any trouble that might arise tackled as soon as it arose.

Further instructions were issued during January and February to Chairmen of Haulage Committees and to Road Officers. Two further conferences were held early in March, attended by all Chairmen of Haulage Committees, all the Road Officers, the Police Liaison Officer, the Food Officer, and the Chief Assistant Commissioner. At those meetings the instructions already drawn up and circulated were discussed, and the full scheme improved in details. At the same time the Chairmen of Haulage Committees and the Road Officers were asked to keep the dates April 27th and 28th free in case the threatened emergency materialised on May 1st. The anticipation seemed likely to be fulfilled, and the final meetings were held on those dates, when the whole plan of action for the entire Division was given its final touches. During March and April a good deal of preparatory work was devoted to the detailed organisation of a despatch rider service.

The soundness of the work was proved by the

event. The preliminary personal contact at divisional meetings between Road Officers and Chairmen of Haulage Committees was proved by experience to have been a valuable asset in the actual emergency.

The Commissioners were established in their head-quarters in the last week of April in readiness for the possible emergency of the following week. They received the "Action" telegram from London on the night of Sunday, May 2nd, the General Council of the Trade Union Congress having decided on, and announced, its declaration of the strike as from midnight of Monday, May 3rd, and the negotiations for a settlement having taken a serious turn on the night of Sunday. The Road Commissioner immediately sent out his divisional "Action" telegrams to all Road Officers and Chairmen of Haulage Committees. By Monday morning, May 3rd—that is, the first morning of the strike—therefore, the whole of the organisation in the "A" Division was in readiness to begin operations.

As an instance of the simplicity with which the Ministry of Transport's scheme was applied to a purely rural district, a map is reproduced (Map Three) showing at a glance the organisation of road transport in the Eastern Division. That Division comprised Cambridgeshire, Bedfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Norfolk and Suffolk. Its Chief Commissioner was Sir Philip Sassoon, Bart., G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P., and its Road Commissioner, Mr. W. C. Clemens, A.M.Inst.C.E. Their headquarters were at Cambridge.

The transport areas were made to coincide with the food areas, and in some cases were subdivided. The areas were Bedford; Bury St. Edmund's (with Newmarket and Sudbury as sub-food areas); Cambridge (with Ely and Huntingdon as sub-food areas); Great Yarmouth; Ipswich (with Felixstowe, Leiston and Woodbridge as sub-food areas); King's Lynn (with Wisbech as sub-food area); Lowestoft; Luton; Norwich (with Diss, East Dereham, North Walsham and Thetford as sub-food areas).

At Cambridge, as in other Divisions, the success of the scheme was chiefly due to the co-ordination between the various departments, particularly between the Haulage Committees and the Road Officers. The Eastern Division was one of the smoothest-running Divisions in the entire country. There were common head-quarters in one building at 12, Hills Road, Cambridge. All the food came from London, except flour, which was provided from Ipswich. There were no dock troubles, no friction, transport was easy enough for it to be possible for the Road Commissioner to co-ordinate it fully from the beginning and to avoid "light" return journeys. The priority regulations had not to be invoked because transport was abundant. The Haulage Committee acted as clearing-houses for food orders and for vehicles, and at King's Lynn a special bureau of information was set up for the benefit of traders.

In the Eastern Division, as in every Division in the country, the insurance problem was satisfactorily settled as a result of the Ministry of Transport's representations to the Insurance Companies. During the Railway Strike of 1919 hauliers clearly showed that they preferred their vehicles to be requisitioned by the Government, for the

moment they were requisitioned the Government assumed full responsibility. In the absence of Government requisitioning in 1926, the insurance companies were induced to issue special insurances against sabotage and other strike risks, and hauliers in general found that arrangement satisfactory.

The precautionary school set up at Cambridge for the training of voluntary drivers was never called on, there being no shortage of drivers.

Indirectly the Eastern Division was affected, it is true, by the trouble in the London docks, but a system of convoys and collecting depots just outside the London area obviated any serious difficulty.

It was not found necessary in the Eastern Division to organise any system of despatch riders, the postal service proving equal to the need. The Eastern Division, in short, was something of a pleasant backwater in the general disturbance. Skeleton services of trains and buses were quickly and adequately manned by volunteers, and in many places the Union strikers, caught up in the prevailing atmosphere, returned to work before the strike was called off. Over 2,000 Cambridge undergraduates were enrolled for service, many of

them being drafted to London. Even the *British Gazette* and the distribution thereof made no disturbance. By the end of the strike the Eastern Division was distributing over 40,000 copies a day of that Winstonian travesty of a newspaper.

FEW people south of the Tweed heard anything about what was happening in Scotland during the strike. The organisation in Scotland was distinct, but not different, from that in England and Wales. As the jurisdiction of the Home Office does not run in Scotland, the emergency measures for Scotland were evolved through the Scottish Office, and the Lord-Advocate of Scotland, Mr. William Watson, K.C., took charge. He was given the official title of Minister in Charge, Scottish Office Emergency Head-quarters. His plans had, however, been worked out in full collaboration with the various Government departments in London, and the scheme was identical. Scotland was divided into five Divisions, with their respective head-quarters at Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee, Aberdeen, and Inverness. Each Division had its Civil Commissioner, Road Commissioner and Road Officers, Food Commissioner and Haulage Committee, and some of them were further sub-divided. Edinburgh, for instance, had a sub-area in Fife.

The strike was endured in Scotland without incident, as befits a country justly famous for its brains. The dockers, for instance, at the four chief docks, wisely and unanimously made up their minds that, their only concern being not to do any work, the best way they could achieve that object, and incidentally avoid friction, was to stay away from the docks. At Leith not a single docker went near the docks during the whole course of the strike. Volunteer workers took on the job from the first day, did their job peacefully, and the docks functioned continuously. Not a single convoy was seen in the country, except at one time in Dundee, and there were no tin hats. An organisation of convoys was ready in case of need, but the need did not arise. In other words, Scotland carried through the strike with the minimum loss of energy and emotion, on the highly salutary principle that a stoppage of business is not an occasion for any further stoppage of common sense. The London docks by contrast were hampered by the lower stage of evolution which characterises the South.

The emergency officers were as undisturbed as the strikers, partly because the organisation was a good one, partly because they were all familiar

with it. It had been in existence for five or six years, and had been used, in its main principles, during the 1919 strike. The only sign of stress in Scotland was that the consumption of milk during the strike fell to an even lower level than its usual level. The surplus milk that went bad in Scotland during the strike was to be ascribed not so much to the vernal fruitfulness of the cows or to the farmers' calculation that milk could be sold more profitably as milk than as cheese—a calculation that would in any event have been quickly falsified, for the price of milk in Scotland did not go up—but rather to the consideration that milk on its merits should be drunk less rather than more.

The Haulage Committees worked according to plan, voluntary drivers were trained intensively in three or four hours, the military were never called out, although here and there extra troops had been stationed as a precautionary measure. Except for the railway catastrophe there was no loss of life or serious injury. The susceptibilities of special constables were humoured in an original manner. It was thought that a special constable, recruited from a given village, might feel some compunction about summarily arresting

his best friend for seditious talk on the village green. Mobile fleets of special constables were therefore recruited far away from the possible danger zones, and they dashed through those zones as strangers.

THE North-Western Division comprised the counties of Anglesey, Carnarvon, Cheshire, Cumberland, Denbigh, Flint, Lancashire, Merioneth, Montgomery and Westmorland. The Civil Commissioner was Major G. Hennessy, O.B.E., M.P., and the Road Commissioner was Lieut.-Colonel H. T. Tudsbury, M.C., M.Inst.C.E., their headquarters being at No. 12, St. John's Lane, Liverpool. It comprised an industrial district—the most densely populated industrial district in the country, South Lancashire—as well as rural districts and important docks.

The machinery in the North-Western Division began to move smoothly as soon as the "Action" telegram was received in the various areas. The Area Haulage Committees and Road Officers set up their Emergency Head-quarters within a few hours. Their main difficulty was to cope with the public confusion and the public ignorance of the scheme. Owing to the decision of the Government not to allow advance expenditure of money,

the food labels for lorries, the drivers' permits and the like could not be fully distributed for a day or two after the "Action" messages were received.

The Despatch Rider Services were started on the morning of May 4th, and on the following day they were increased to provide one day journey and one night journey connecting every area in the Division. The despatch riders were one of the essential factors in the organisation, for they ensured rapid communication from the outset between Divisional Head-quarters and all the local offices. A letter could be sent to the farthest point in the Division and an answer received within twenty-four hours, and in the majority of cases an answer could be received within twelve hours.

One of the decisive achievements of the North-Western Division was the initial movement of transport on an imposing scale. Lancashire people normally get off the mark quickly, are nearly as intelligent as Scotsmen, and considerably more wide-awake than Southerners. The energy and keenness of the Haulage Committees and Road Officers throughout the Division resulted in an abundance of transport movement from the very first day. It increased greatly when Mr. Henderson, the Deputy-Chairman of the Cunard Shipping

Company, who had undertaken the job of organising the docks, quickly filled the docks with volunteers, and the pool of lorries in Liverpool began to function. Unlike the Haulage Committees elsewhere, the Liverpool Haulage Committee organised a pool, in the same way as the Board of Trade organised a milk pool in Hyde Park. Therein, however, it departed from the Ministry of Transport's plan, and provided the only exception to the general working of that plan. There was, however, surprisingly little interference with the lorries.

The Civil Commissioner of the North-Western Division, Major Hennessy, was averse at the beginning to the use of food labels. Although the labels had been printed the day before the strike began, and distributed within the following two days, he chose to try and do without them, desiring if possible to dispense with more abnormality than was necessary. Instructions were sent out to the Road Officers not to issue the labels till further notice. On the morning of Wednesday, May 5th, however, a Civil Commissioner's conference, attended by the Road Commissioner and by the Police Liaison Officer, received reports from the areas which made it inadvisable for the

labels to be any longer held back, and orders to that effect were at once sent out.

One of the interesting and in parts amusing episodes in the Lancashire experience arose from certain difficulties encountered in the distribution of food. At many of the warehouses and flour mills Union men, remaining at work by virtue of the Trade Union Congress's exception in favour of the food supplies, nevertheless refused to load or unload vehicles if they happened to be driven by non-Union drivers. Conversely, Union drivers refused to be loaded by non-Union loaders. The net effect of such a situation, if allowed to continue, would have been to place the strikers in full control of the food supply. The difficulty was met and overcome by a neat device. A small printer was discovered, who during the night printed 50,000 copies of the Ministry of Transport's Blue Permits; those permits were hurriedly distributed by special despatch riders among all the drivers of food vehicles early the next morning (May 6th), and the Union men, faced with such permits and knowing from their instructions that they were working on the basis of permits—a permit's a permit for all that—blandly rose above all distinctions of permits or of persons, lorries were loaded, unloaded,

and driven, by non-Union and Union men harmoniously, and the situation was saved. That evening the Council of Action decided to withdraw its own permits, pending a reconsideration of its policy. That withdrawal automatically withdrew all further trouble on that score, and nothing more was heard about the reconsideration of policy.

The efficacy of the hurriedly printed permits was further helped by another pleasant inspiration. The Liverpool police were asked to arrange for the patrolling of certain circular routes. On each route two policemen on a motor-cycle and side-car combination drove round and round in their own particular circular route without stopping. The circle was of such a size that they passed the same point every ten minutes. By that means a general impression was created of an endless stream of policemen racing along on motor-bicycles, seconded by a spare policeman in the side-car, the net total of the force being the two policemen aforesaid.

The Liverpool police were so impressed by the efficacy of this harmless method of, as it were, broadcasting policemen, that they were preparing to extend the scheme on a large scale, when the strike collapsed.

At a conference convened by the Civil Com-

missioner in the afternoon of May 5th some doubt was felt that essential commodities might not be transported quickly enough. Reports had been received from various quarters complaining of delay. The delay, it appeared, was partly accounted for by the over-confidence of drivers who had not reckoned with the possibility of being interfered with by strikers on their journeys and who had been surprised to find their calculations miscarry. To prevent any possible serious shortage of supplies it was therefore decided at the Civil Commissioner's conference to issue at once throughout the Division the order for the regulation of Priorities under the Emergency Powers Act of 1920. That order, in which were included certain items of the second schedule as agreed to by Sir Arnold Rushton, the Food Commissioner, was sent out to all the areas by the night Despatch Rider Service, and was published everywhere except at Manchester on the morning of Thursday, May 6th. Manchester wanted publication to be delayed in their area, preferring not to raise the question at a time when otherwise they were getting on well. With the single exception of the Manchester area, therefore, the regulation of Priorities applied after May 6th throughout the Division. Later on in the strike

Manchester found themselves in difficulties, and it was decided that the regulation of Priorities should come into operation in Manchester on May 13th, but the strike had by then been called off. After the issue of the Priorities regulation no further difficulties in obtaining abundant transport were encountered in the North-Western Division.

During the first twenty-four hours of the strike the Liverpool Haulage Committee was unduly discouraged over its attempts to put traders in touch with the owners of vehicles who were able and willing to execute transport orders. It was therefore decided at a conference held in the Commissioner's office on the morning of May 5th to try the method of a pool. The whole difficulty, however, was due to lack of faith in the general scheme which was so successfully practised in every other Division. By May 5th the Liverpool Haulage Committee had only between five and ten lorries in the voluntary pool at the Albert Dock, and those few were given work the moment they got there. Yet every hour of the day hundreds of orders and requests for transport poured into the offices of the Haulage Committee. By the fourth day the pool of lorries had been increased to 300 in number.

Some of the orders for transport were as bizarre as might be expected by those who have had experience of the imaginative defects shown by large masses of people. One request would be for the removal of a hundred tons of flour to some distant inland town ; another for the transport of half a hundred-weight of bacon or two pounds of cheese from Liverpool to Prescot. It was obviously fantastic to expect that transport could be coped with on such lines. Largely on the initiative of Sir Arnold Rushton and Mr. Irvine, a member of the Haulage Committee, it was therefore decided to set up 'Traders' Committees, to whom all requests for transport had to be addressed. Those Traders' Committees were responsible for sorting out orders and sending them in a practical form to the Haulage Committee.

At Manchester a lorry pool had been prepared, but fortunately never materialised, the prescribed organisation proving adequate to the need.

The docks organisation rapidly improved. When Mr. Henderson accepted the responsibility of organising the docks, there was only one evening before the strike was due to begin, and the docks were a serious proposition, employing normally 30,000 men. The strike started at

midnight ; yet by the afternoon of that first day he had recruited 500 volunteers from the Liverpool Cotton Exchange and started them at work. By the following morning there were 2,000 volunteers at work, and clearances from the docks were being effected by road transport. It was important to keep up regular clearances, for any irregularity would have involved congestion on the quays. Large quantities of food were being unloaded on to the quays, and correspondingly increased transport facilities were needed for their removal to warehouses, cold storage and other destinations. The Haulage Committee therefore decided to increase their pool of lorries at the Albert Dock. One or two members of the Haulage Committee worked hard—one of them, Mr. Lorimer, worked himself to a breakdown in health—and by the end of the third day the pool had been expanded to a maximum of three hundred lorries on a voluntary basis. During the period of the strike the committee transported 550 cargoes by road, or 6,596 tons of goods, and by rail 654 wagon-loads, or 3,297 tons. In all, including the return loads arranged for, 10,000 tons of goods, mainly food, were transported.

The main points of destination for both road

and rail transport from Liverpool were London, Glasgow, Birmingham, Leeds, Newcastle, Leicester, Hull and Sheffield. In the first few days of the strike the organisation of the pool led to commercial loss in the running of the lorries, but experience helped to put that right.

Another of the initial difficulties was the supply of drivers for steam lorries. Owing to the heavy outgoing traffic, fifty steam lorry drivers had to be mobilised at once, there was not enough time to test their driving, and some of the steam lorries suffered, even in some cases to the point of being put out of action, by the inexperienced hands at the wheel.

At 4 p.m. on the third day of the strike Barrow-in-Furness reported trouble, the dock gatemen and safety men threatening to down tools. Barrow-in-Furness is an outlandish place, but by 11 p.m. of that same day the Liverpool head-quarters had successfully transported to it a complete contingent of electricians, dock gatemen and engine-drivers, twenty men in all, who proceeded to take over the entire machinery and plant while the hesitant strikers were asleep.

The fifth day was a turning point. Not only was the machinery working more smoothly, the

resources of transport increasing, and the men becoming more experienced in their jobs, but the general public was more acquainted with the way in which the machinery worked, and the headquarters and area organisations were no longer inundated with questions, silly or intelligent. The strain perceptibly lightened. The Haulage Committees were becoming known in their areas, and traders were making good use of them both in their search for hauliers and for general help in transport. Intimidation was generally decreasing, especially in the Liverpool and Manchester districts, although there were one or two setbacks, as, for instance, in Preston and in Birkenhead. The food labels for lorries and the permits for drivers worked well, were popular, and abuses were rare.

On Saturday, May 8th, Manchester reported a threatened danger. The docks had not been opened. Manchester suddenly realised that the bread supply would not last more than two days unless the docks were opened. There were several ships of grain waiting in the docks to be unloaded; there was a large supply of flour in the dock warehouses; but there was no labour. The Liverpool headquarters decided against the expedient of sending flour by road from Liverpool to Manchester,

and instead arranged that the Manchester docks should be worked in a way similar to that adopted by Mr. Henderson at Liverpool.

Dock trouble was reported also from Preston, where on Friday and Saturday, May 7th and 8th, the unloading of both foodstuffs and petrol was being interfered with, as was transport in general. The Civil Commissioner and the Road Commissioner left Liverpool by car at 5.30 on Saturday afternoon and attended an emergency meeting that had been convened at Preston at 8 o'clock that evening. The local Haulage Committee, the Chairman of the Voluntary Service Committee, the Chief Constable and the Road Officer attended the meeting, and measures were decided on which solved the difficulty the next day.

The Civil Commissioner and the Road Commissioner, pleased with themselves, no doubt, over the Preston success, thereupon decided on further jaunts. They left Preston by car at 9 a.m. on Sunday morning, May 9th, and attended an emergency meeting at Lancaster an hour later. On May 10th the Road Commissioner went on to Manchester to see how the docks were functioning. The officials in charge of the organisation had been working hard during the week-end, and

he was just in time to see the advance party of forty volunteers set out with their kit from the Town Hall *en route* for the docks. The Manchester docks were opened, 500 more volunteers took up work there on the following morning, and success, belated as it was, was achieved.

The Preston and Manchester docks having been restored to working order, the general organisation of the Division worked smoothly for the remaining few days of the strike. It was the view of the authorities in the North-Western Division—a view shared generally in every Division in the country—that after the first week's experience of the emergency organisation, the food supplies of the people could have been secured for an indefinite period. The shipping companies even announced that they proposed shortly to advertise for outward cargoes. A peculiar development in Liverpool was the co-opting of a railway representative on to the Haulage Committee after the first three days of the strike, a measure which had some effect in co-ordinating rail and road transport as the railways restarted to function. On and after May 10th—that is, after one week of the strike—the food loads from Liverpool increased at a rapid rate.

There was one minor tragedy. On the first

morning of the strike a steamer arrived in Liverpool Docks to pick up a cargo of flour for Ireland. The crew, in merry mood, went ashore for a day's holiday, it being an ill strike that does nobody any good. The crew returned to their ship in the evening and were surprised, and a little indignant, to find that it had been loaded by voluntary labour. The rest of the evening ashore appeared to be jeopardised, for there seemed to be no reason why the ship, being loaded, should not sail. Invention, however, is the mother of a sailor's evening ashore, and the crew brilliantly refused to sail a cargo that had resulted from blackleg loading. They went ashore to continue their holiday. The Road Commissioner at once began exploring, succeeded by 11 p.m. in collecting a crew, all of them possessing the Board of Trade Certificate, the ship sailed at midnight, and the errant crew returned in the early hours to find neither ship nor bed to lie on.

THE system of Haulage Committees and Road Officers were the pivot of the roads organisation. The general plans of the Haulage Committees throughout the country was that its members should be recruited from the trade, that the work of haulage should be carried out in the ordinary commercial way, the Road Officers being the representatives of the Ministry of Transport, whose duty it was to help the Committees if and when they got into difficulties. In retrospect the remarkably unanimous opinion of Civil Commissioners, Road Commissioners and Road Officers from all over the country testifies to the success of that plan, one of the incidental attractions of it being, as has been remarked above, that it cost little to the Government. In one or two cases Haulage Committees regarded the Road Officers as a nuisance, or as unnecessary ornaments, or complained because their responsibility was to the Ministry rather than to the voluntary Haulage Committee. Those instances were few, and were

due more to the simple truth that where two or more people are gathered together they shall quarrel, than to any defect in the organisation itself. In the main the Haulage Committees and the Road Officers worked in the closest harmony.

The problem proved easiest of solution in the rural areas, where the people normally feed themselves, and where industrial crises mainly affect the farmers by improving their export business to the other areas. In the densely populated industrial districts the difficulties were greater, partly because there were more people to feed and their food had to be brought to them, partly because the trade unionists were better organised in the towns and distribution therefore more effectively hampered. The most difficult problem, as we have seen, was that of the dock areas.

In most areas the Haulage Committees and the Road Officers used joint emergency offices. Owing to the fact that no requisitioning of vehicles was resorted to, the Road Officers had little to do beyond helping the Haulage Committees. In Liverpool, it is true, the Haulage Committee passed through something of a crisis on the first day, when it proved unequal to the vast demand for transport.

The situation was saved by the stolid matter-of-fact tradesmen, who, finding there was no transport, contrived somehow or other to improvise transport for themselves. It was after the first twenty-four hours that the voluntary pooling system described in an earlier chapter was brought into operation. Every member of the Haulage Committee was a haulier. They and other hauliers contributed their vehicles to the pool at the Albert Docks and placed the pool under the single management of one member of the Committee. A small sub-committee of traders was formed, as has been recorded, for sifting orders, and it was presided over by another member of the Haulage Committee. The routine was for trade orders to pass from the Traders' Committee through the Haulage Committee to the despatch manager of the Albert Docks pool. Throughout the rest of the country normal commercial machinery was used with excellent results, and it avoided commercial loss to the hauliers. The Liverpool Haulage pool failed as a commercial proposition, and financial loss was involved to the hauliers. The Haulage Committee fixed the transport rates at 50 per cent. above railway rates, thinking thereby to have safeguarded themselves. What they omitted to take into

account was the frequency of empty return journeys from distant objectives—a phenomenon which was partially remedied as the days yielded up their experience—and the damage done to vehicles by volunteer drivers. Owner drivers of small two-seater cars who, in the excitement of being up and doing something, deluded themselves quite sincerely into thinking they could drive anything from a charabanc to a steam-tractor, were hardly a paying proposition, and it was easier for individual hauliers acting independently to gauge their cost than it was for a pool to do so.

It is an interesting fact that commercial road transport in the big cities was abundant, and functioned, not only without the need of requisitioning, but even without the need of the "directional" powers invested in the Road Commissioners.

The question of return loads was a serious one. Light running was a waste of time, energy and expense alike, but it required considerable forethought and organisation to avoid it. The problem was particularly well handled in the Eastern Division. On the other hand, the ideal of full returns can become a mania. There was a classic case. A Manchester vehicle delivered a load in Liverpool,

and to avoid a "light" return, accepted from the Liverpool organisation a return load—but a "return" load to Barrow-in-Furness. That process could be carried on indefinitely, like the house that Jack built. For instance, a vehicle which had been sent from Manchester on behalf of H.M. Stationery Office to Edinburgh, was thence sent on to Glasgow, from Glasgow to Paisley to load flour for Carlisle, from Carlisle was sent to London with biscuits. That lorry passed completely out of the control of the Manchester organisation, and was never heard of again till the owner began worrying about it.

Shortly as the haulage organisation can be described, it was vast in scope, and its smoothness in execution was something of an achievement. There were, for instance, innumerable incidental duties devolving on the Haulage Committees. Volunteer drivers had to be housed, fed and kept an eye on. Some drivers, expected back the next morning, would not return for three or four days, having lost their way or having attempted to improve the shining hour by original, if not always helpful, enterprise. Volunteer drivers would damage engines, or drive into ditches. Some of them, having brought their transport to a standstill,

and thereby belied its name and their purpose, would wander about looking for a garage, and on returning would find their cargo gone. Similarly the volunteer clerks who kept the records of orders and general business would sometimes get themselves into a fever of worry and their books into something worse. One day a London chemist agitatedly requested transport for a ten-ounce bottle of medicine urgently wanted in Carlisle. He could not send it by post, he explained, because the limit for postal packages was eight ounces. When it was suggested that he should send it in two five-ounce bottles, he briskly remarked that he had never thought of that. All such incidental and unforeseeable difficulties fell on the shoulders of the Haulage Committees.

Road transport was the vital artery of the nation during the strike. The Road Commissioner in each Division had the most direct responsibility for the success of Road Transport. In a typical case the Road Commissioner's staff at head-quarters consisted, besides himself, of a chief assistant, three assistants, a finance officer, three typists, two clerks and one messenger. They were volunteers, collected at short notice, worked for the first week from 8.15 a.m. to midnight every day, including

Saturday and Sunday, and had on their shoulders the full ultimate responsibility for feeding their particular quota of the population. The chief assistant had started his work two months before the emergency arose, the three assistants had been coached three weeks before, but actually started work at midday of Monday, May 3rd.

The following detailed record of the Despatch Rider Service in the North-Western Division is given as typical. A regular service of despatch riders was organised from the Road Commissioner's head-quarter office, leaving head-quarters at 9 a.m. and 9 p.m., the day and night services being run to identical time-tables. The main or trunk routes were :

Liverpool to Carlisle, via St. Helens, Wigan, Preston, Lancaster, Kendal, Penrith and Carlisle. On this route the Liverpool—Lancaster section was worked by riders from Liverpool and the Lancaster—Carlisle section by riders from Carlisle.

Liverpool to Stockport, via Warrington and Manchester.

Liverpool to Caernarvon, via Warrington, Chester, Flint, Rhyl, Colwyn Bay, Bangor and Caernarvon. This route, however, was a composite one, and was worked in conjunction with the Warrington to



DIAGRAM OF N.W. DIVISION DESPATCH RIDER SERVICES.

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Route 1. Liverpool—Carlisle | Route 7. Liverpool—Stockport |
| " 2. Whitehaven—Penrith | " 8. Oldham—Manchester |
| " 3. Barrow—Kendal | " 9. Wrexham—Warrington |
| " 4. Burnley—Preston | " 10. Crewe—Chester |
| " 5. Fleetwood—Preston | " 11. Caernarvon—Chester |
| " 6. Rochdale—Wigan | |

Wrexham route and the Chester to Caernarvon route.

In addition to those trunk routes, branch routes were arranged which joined up with the main routes and carried the system of communication to all the important towns throughout the whole area. The riders working the subsidiary routes were provided by the various chairmen of Haulage Committees in the towns at the extremity of the branch lines, which were connected up with the main trunk routes at the towns at the other end of the service.

The Branch services were as follows :

- (a) Whitehaven, via Workington, Keswick, to Penrith on the Liverpool-Carlisle route.
- (b) Barrow to Kendal, on the Liverpool-Carlisle route.
- (c) Burnley, via Blackburn, to Preston, on the Liverpool-Carlisle route.
- (d) Fleetwood, via Blackpool, to Preston.
- (e) Rochdale, via Bury and Bolton, to Wigan, on the Liverpool-Carlisle route.
- (f) Oldham to Manchester, on the Liverpool-Stockport main trunk route.
- (g) Wrexham, via Chester (where connection

was made with the Caernarvon route), to Warrington.

(h) Crewe to Chester.

(i) Caernarvon, via Bangor, Colwyn Bay, Rhyl, Flint, to Chester, where connection was made with the routes referred to above.

As punctuality was the first essential in such a service, it was decided, in consultation with the Automobile Association, to draw up the time-tables on the basis of twenty to twenty-four miles per hour, a calculation which was justified by experience. The local areas in addition organised motor-cycle Despatch Rider Services of their own to serve local or emergency needs. The despatch riders distributed the *British Gazette*.

A system of liaison between the four vital services—transport, food, police and the volunteer service—was thoroughly thought out in advance and contributed greatly to the general smoothness of the work. In every area the liaison arrangements were closely knit, in many instances being effected by the housing of the various departments in one building. One member of each Haulage Committee generally acted as a liaison officer for the committee, and all haulage arrangements between the various areas were handled by the respective

liaison officers. Co-ordination at head-quarters was in many cases effected by meetings held twice a day between the Police Liaison Officer, the Food Commissioner, the Assistant Civil Commissioner and the Road Commissioner.

A good story came from Oldham. Many bank clerks working at the Manchester banks live at Oldham. Trams and trains had stopped. An enterprising charabanc company organised a transport service specially for those bank clerks. The strikers, however, decided to retaliate. They succeeded in destroying one of the charabancs, and in holding up many others, with the result that the charabanc company, regarding its own property as of more immediate moment than the Manchester banks, decided to discontinue the service. The Manchester bank managers thereupon wrote to the Council of Action, explained that they fully appreciated the point of view of the strikers, but equally assumed that the inevitable corollary would be appreciated on the other side, namely, that in the absence of bank clerks it would be impossible to pay out funds for strike pay. The Oldham Council of Action so thoroughly appreciated that corollary that they sent a deputation to the Road Commissioner, appealing to him with delicate if unintentional irony,

on the ground of an essential service, to provide Government transport for the bank clerks between Oldham and Manchester. Instead of granting that request, however, the Road Commissioner referred the Council of Action to the charabanc company in Oldham, suggesting that if a guarantee were given to that company that its charabancs would not again be interfered with, all might be well. The suggestion was acted on, and the charabancs and the clerks restarted operations. Could there be a neater epitome of the complete futility of the industrial war as a whole?

There were some initial but minor clashes of organisation. In one area the same volunteer, broad-shouldered as he was, found himself at a loss when he discovered that he had accepted appointments both as Chairman of the Haulage Committee and as Food Officer of the same area. It could not be done. The delimitation of the various areas called for considerable readjustment in the first few days in order to reconcile the interests of the various departments, and the areas in some districts, for instance in North Wales, were not satisfactorily adjusted before the strike ended.

and proportionately decreased. A private car that was being used for distributing newspapers was incidentally not being used as a private car. The Hyde Park lorries would still have been lorries, even if there had been no strike ; they would still have been used for transport purposes ; they would still have needed petrol. There was some anxiety in the first few days lest the small stations scattered about the country should not continue to replenish their supplies, many of them not being able to accommodate more than a two-days' supply in their yards, and there was some fear of hoarding. Road transport, however, proved equal to the first contingency and the "can-for-can" system to the second. By the "can-for-can" system no one could obtain a can of petrol without bringing with him an empty can to take it away in. The hoarding of petrol was thereby prevented. Some of the petrol dumps set up for the volunteer organisations, as, for instance, in Hyde Park and on the Horse Guards Parade ground, were a little embarrassed at first on discovering that petrol distribution in this country is conducted wholly on a cash basis. No credit apparently is ever given.

It will surprise most people that the petrol supply during the strike presented no serious

*Chapter Eight**Petroleum*

PETROL is as necessary for transport as transport is for food. Fortunately it did not call for any organisation commensurate with its importance. An organisation had, indeed, been hatched at the Board of Trade whereby the country was divided up into petrol areas, and the organisation was ready to function in case of need. It was not needed. Petrol in this country is normally distributed in the main by the three big companies, and there was no need for the Board of Trade to do much beyond helping those companies to continue their normal commercial distribution. Nor was there much fear for a shortage of petrol. Before the strike began there was enough petrol in the country to satisfy normal needs for several months, and it was found during the strike that the emergency need of petrol was little greater than the normal need. That discovery, odd as it seemed when it was first made, was accounted for by the fact that, although road transport for vital services was enormously increased, other services automatically

problem. The ocean installations were well supplied, and incoming tanks were dealt with by naval and other labour without difficulty. The storage places along the Thames were kept supplied by naval ratings. In any strike the barges are the first to come out, partly out of their general keenness for some sort of change, partly because barges are easy to leave, and have a leisurely air of unimportance. The plan of manning the Thames petrol barges by naval ratings has been in existence for many years, and was readily applied. The road distribution from the ocean installations and the river storage tanks was adequately dealt with by the companies' drivers, many of whom are non-union men. The most alarming danger that was presented to the petrol supplies during the strike was one that went almost unnoticed. A convoy of petrol lorries was being conducted from Thameshaven, by military convoy, and at one point an escorting Tommy, sitting on the top of a petrol tank, took out a cigarette, struck a match and lighted up to while away the time. He carried it off in complete, if unconscious, security.


EPITAPH

THE importance of Great Britain's experience in the first fortnight of May, 1926, lies in the establishment of the truth that road transport nowadays is equal to a nation-wide emergency. The Ministry of Transport gained universal admiration and gratitude by the efficient organisation prepared and carried through so successfully. Colonel Ashley himself and his officers were chiefly responsible for it. The Ministry of Transport organised, and the voluntary services administered the organisation.

INSTITUTE



PART TWO : OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS



THE actual record of what happened when the transport organisation was put to the test has its elements of excitement. It is less exciting but not less useful to record the official dossier which shows the exact place occupied by transport in the general plan of action decided on by the Government. The plan was outlined in a circular of instructions sent out in advance to Town Councils, Metropolitan Borough Councils, Urban District Councils and Rural District Councils throughout the country. The circular was dated November 20th, 1925, which date suggests two historical foot-notes : (1) that in August, 1925, when the so-called general strike was first threatened, and averted by the Government's offer of a subsidy, the Government's machinery for dealing with a strike was not as complete as it might have been—hence, no doubt, the subsidy ; and (2) that the organisation which proved so effective in May, 1926, was perfected as long ago as November, 1925—five months in advance.

The circular ran as follows :

CIRCULAR 636.
(*England and Wales.*)

To

Town Councils.

Metropolitan Borough Councils.

Urban District Councils.

Rural District Councils.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1,
20TH NOVEMBER, 1925.

SIR,

I am directed by the Minister of Health to refer to the Circular Letter which was sent to Local Authorities in May, 1922 (see Appendix (A)), in which it was stated that it would be for Local Authorities to make such arrangements for the maintenance of local services as might be thought to be required in the event of need arising.

The events of recent years have shown that an industrial dispute may be so extended as to interfere seriously with communications, the conveyance of food and of other necessities, the supply of light and power and the health and means of livelihood of the population at large. While it is desirable that Government authorities, whether central or

local, should keep aloof from any industrial dispute so far as it affects only the employers and the employed in the industry concerned, it is essential that other members of the community should be protected from the dangers and inconveniences of such a situation as is here indicated. This protection can best be supplied by decentralised organisation designed to secure the maintenance of services essential to the well-being of the community.

Should such an emergency occur it is to their Local Authorities that the people will naturally turn for help in the difficulties which they may have to meet, and in order that any action initiated locally may harmonise with the national measures which the Government consider it desirable to take they think it necessary now to communicate to Local Authorities the following outline of the organisation which would be brought into operation by the Government to deal with essential services which are not purely local in character. This outline will, if it be necessary, be supplemented by further details in a later communication. By "emergency" is meant a state of affairs necessitating the issue of a Proclamation under the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, as a preliminary to the issue of

Regulations "for securing the essentials of life to the country."

The organisation which the Government propose is designed to supplement and to assist in an emergency the normal methods of communication, supply and distribution and to give to all those who can help an opportunity of doing so in the manner most required. It is not intended that the Government should substitute new machinery for that ordinarily existing to meet the essential needs of the community.

1. A Minister will in such an emergency act as Civil Commissioner on behalf of the Government in each of ten Divisions covering the whole of England and Wales. He will be assisted by a staff consisting mainly of representatives of the Departments of Government concerned and dealing with the following subjects : Transport ; Food ; Postal Services ; Coal. It will be the duty of the Civil Commissioner and his staff during the emergency to keep in touch with the Local Authorities in each Division and to be available for consultation by them ; and he will be empowered if necessary to give decisions on behalf of the Government.

The towns in which Civil Commissioners will be

stationed and the general outlines of the areas of the Divisions for which they will act are set out in Appendix (B).

The Officers who will act as the Chief Assistants to the Civil Commissioners and those who will act as Technical Representatives for the services mentioned have been appointed, and these Officers will, as requisite, put themselves in touch with representatives of Local Authorities, and provide them with such information as may be practicable in regard to details of the organisation.

2. Each Division is divided into suitable areas for administering essential national services and, if considered necessary, for recruiting volunteers for those purposes. In each area there will on an emergency be a local Food Officer, a local Road Officer and a Haulage Committee and a Coal Emergency Officer, besides representatives (where required) for other essential services. There will also be a Chairman selected by the Government to convene and preside over a Volunteer Service Committee in each area for the recruitment of volunteers to assist in maintaining essential national services.

In any town in which the Chairman of the Committee might consider it necessary to open a

recruiting centre, it is earnestly hoped that it would be found practicable for the Local Authority concerned to combine with him in making the centre available for recruiting both for national and for local purposes, allocating by arrangement volunteers to local and national services in accordance with their qualifications and the needs of the occasion. Local Authorities are not expected to take any action so far as national services are concerned, unless and until approached by the Chairman.

3. On an emergency arising reliance will be placed to the utmost extent upon normal channels for the supply and distribution of food, and to this end the Divisional Food Representative upon the Civil Commissioner's staff will arrange for consultation with the principal traders as to the stocks of essential food-stuffs in their possession or in transit. In the event of any shortage or delay in the supply of essential food-stuffs to the Division, the Food Representative will be in possession of information as to alternative sources of supply and the means to make them available.

Local distribution and local shortages not affecting national supplies will ordinarily be dealt with by the local Food Officer.

4. Road Transport will be dealt with on similar

lines. The Road Commissioner upon the Civil Commissioner's staff will be assisted by Road Officers and Haulage Committees in each of the areas comprised in the Division, who will endeavour by voluntary arrangement to promote the economical use of existing vehicles and where necessary the diversion of vehicles from less to more important services. Road Commissioners and Road Officers will be furnished with powers to this end should the exercise of such powers prove necessary.

5. In an emergency full directions will be sent as to the supply and distribution of coal. These directions may, if necessary, limit the supply of coal obtainable for any household or business, and may also place upon Local Authorities responsibilities for regulating the consumption of gas and electricity within their districts. They would probably necessitate in most cases the allocation of a particular officer or officers by the Local Authority during the period that they were in force.

The Local Authority will have the assistance of a Coal Emergency Officer and of a Committee of Traders within their own district.

6. The maintenance of law and order and the protection of persons and property from violence

may be one of the most important services. The organisation of the necessary arrangements and the control of the Police and Special Constabulary rest with the Police Authorities and the Chief Constables, but the Local Authorities might co-operate, for instance, in securing able-bodied citizens of good character to serve as Special Constables. The arrangements for the enrolment of Special Constables will be made by the Police, and any men who come forward as Special Constables, or who offer their services in a general capacity and appear most suited for service as Special Constables should be referred to the Police Station or other place of enrolment appointed for the purpose.

7. While it is impossible to draw any hard and fast line of demarcation between national and local services which is universally applicable the position may be broadly defined as follows : Local Authorities are expected to undertake responsibility for the maintenance of local public utility services ; in addition they are asked to co-operate with the national organisation in regard to local transport and the local distribution of coal. In the absence of further directions they are not expected to undertake responsibility for the local distribution of food nor are they asked to accept responsibility

for shipping, railway or postal communications, or docks and harbours except where the Local Authority are also the Port Authority.

8. It will be realised that in an emergency the burden upon national resources must in any event be considerable and responsibility could not be accepted by the Government for expenditure incurred by Local Authorities in meeting local needs. Where, however, a joint recruiting station is established, the expenditure incurred would have to be allocated between the Government and the Local Authority concerned. Precise instructions on this point would be issued to Chairmen of Volunteer Service Committees.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

W. A. ROBINSON.

The Clerk

to the Local Authority.

INSTITUTE



APPENDIX (A).

CIRCULAR 312.

(*England and Wales.*)

MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1,

SIR, MAY 23, 1922.

I am directed to refer to the "Memorandum for the Guidance of Local Authorities," which was issued in April of last year, and to state that His Majesty's Government have decided that the Memorandum is to be regarded as withdrawn from the present date, and that it will be for Local Authorities to make such arrangements for maintenance of local services as may be thought to be required in the event of need arising. The copies of the memorandum sent to you should be destroyed forthwith as the financial and other provisions will not be applicable on any future occasion.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

W. A. ROBINSON, *Secretary.*

The Clerk
to the Local Authority.

APPENDIX (B).

Divisional Head-quarters.	Area of Division,
LONDON	- London, Middlesex, Herts, Essex, Kent, Sussex, Surrey.
READING	- Berks, Oxfordshire, Bucks, Hants, Isle of Wight, Wilts.
BRISTOL	- Gloucestershire, Somerset, Dorset, Devon, Cornwall.
CARDIFF	- Glamorgan, Carmarthen, Pem- broke, Cardigan, Radnor, Brecon, Monmouthshire.
LIVERPOOL	- Lancashire, Cheshire, Denbighshire, Montgomeryshire, Merioneth, Carnarvonshire, Anglesey, Flint- shire, Cumberland, Westmorland.
NEWCASTLE- ON-TYNE	- Northumberland, Durham.
LEEDS	- Yorkshire.
NOTTINGHAM	- Notts, Lincolnshire, Rutland, Leicestershire, Northants, Derby- shire.

APPENDIX (A).

CIRCULAR 312.

(*England and Wales.*)

MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1,

SIR,

MAY 23, 1922.

I am directed to refer to the "Memorandum for the Guidance of Local Authorities," which was issued in April of last year, and to state that His Majesty's Government have decided that the Memorandum is to be regarded as withdrawn from the present date, and that it will be for Local Authorities to make such arrangements for maintenance of local services as may be thought to be required in the event of need arising. The copies of the memorandum sent to you should be destroyed forthwith as the financial and other provisions will not be applicable on any future occasion.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

W. A. ROBINSON, *Secretary.*

The Clerk

to the Local Authority.

APPENDIX (B).

Divisional Head-quarters.	Area of Division,
LONDON	- London, Middlesex, Herts, Essex, Kent, Sussex, Surrey.
READING	- Berks, Oxfordshire, Bucks, Hants, Isle of Wight, Wilts.
BRISTOL	- Gloucestershire, Somerset, Dorset, Devon, Cornwall.
CARDIFF	- Glamorgan, Carmarthen, Pembroke, Cardigan, Radnor, Brecon, Monmouthshire.
LIVERPOOL	- Lancashire, Cheshire, Denbighshire, Montgomeryshire, Merioneth, Carnarvonshire, Anglesey, Flintshire, Cumberland, Westmorland.
NEWCASTLE- ON-TYNE	- Northumberland, Durham.
LEEDS	- Yorkshire.
NOTTINGHAM	- Notts, Lincolnshire, Rutland, Leicestershire, Northants, Derbyshire.

BIRMINGHAM - Warwickshire, Worcestershire,
Herefordshire, Salop, Stafford-
shire.

CAMBRIDGE - Cambridgeshire, Beds, Hunts,
Norfolk, Suffolk.

On April 30th, that is, on the day before the General Council of the Trade Union Congress decided on the declaration of a so-called "general" strike, the following subsidiary circular was sent out :

CIRCULAR 699.
(*England and Wales.*)

To

County Councils.

Town Councils.

Metropolitan Borough Councils.

Urban District Councils.

Rural District Councils.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1,
30TH APRIL, 1926.

SIR,

I am instructed by the Minister of Health to refer to Circular 636 of the 20th November, 1925, and to state that the following information is communicated to you in accordance with the third

paragraph of the introductory section of that Circular.

It is to be hoped that the present negotiations on the Coal Industry will have a successful issue, but if unfortunately this should not be the case and there should be a stoppage of that Industry upon a National scale, the Government consider it necessary that part of the organisation referred to in the above Circular should be set in readiness to operate. I am accordingly directed to transmit to you the enclosed list of Civil Commissioners and their Divisional Staffs, which will be set up upon the issue of the Proclamation under the Emergency Powers Acts, should the Government deem such Proclamation to be necessary in the National interest.

If such a stoppage is confined to the Coal Industry, it is hoped that it will not be necessary to expand this Emergency Organisation extensively or to call for recruits for assisting to maintain essential services. Should, however, the area of the dispute be unhappily so widened as to cause a stoppage in other Industries affecting such services, you will receive from the Civil Commissioner for your Division a list of the Area Representatives of the several services, referred to in paragraph 2 of the

Circular, together with the names of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Volunteer Service Committees, with whom it is hoped that your Council and their Officers will find it possible to co-operate to the fullest extent.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
W. A. ROBINSON.

The Clerk
to the Local Authority.

The complete list of Civil Commissioners and other officers who together constituted the nucleus of the organisation throughout England and Wales and in Scotland, is given in an Appendix at the end of the volume. The list had been drawn up many months before May, 1926. The various Commissioners, officers and representatives had met in their Division head-quarters long before the emergency arose, and nothing was left to chance that could be organised by hypothetical work in advance.

ON April 30th the Proclamation of a State of Emergency was made by the King, on the advice of the Cabinet, under the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, and the Emergency Regulations, 1926, were made on the same day. The powers thereby given to the Minister of Transport were of a wide and drastic character. By foresight which proved to be as tactically expedient as it was psychologically wise, the Minister made hardly any use of those emergency powers. By deciding, for instance, not to requisition vehicles, he avoided serious dislocation in the haulage trade, and equally avoided serious provocation of the striking trade unionists. By the same token the country was spared the inrush of reparation problems after the event.

The relevant passages in the Emergency Regulations which concerned the Minister of Transport were as follows :

4.—(1) The Minister of Transport may by order :—

- (a) regulate, restrict, or give directions with respect to, the use for the purposes of road transport including the fares to be charged, or the sale or purchase of any horses or vehicles in use or capable of being used for the purpose of road transport ;
- (b) take possession of any such horses or vehicles as aforesaid, or require them to be placed at the disposal of the Minister, or of any person specified in or duly authorised in pursuance of the order, either absolutely or by way of hire, and either for immediate or future use, and may provide for giving directions to the directors, officers, or other persons concerned in the management of any undertaking of which such horses or vehicles form part as to the management and user thereof ;
- (c) require persons owning, or having in their possession or under their control, any such horses or vehicles as aforesaid to make to the Minister, or to any person specified by the Minister in that behalf, returns giving the prescribed particulars with respect to those horses and vehicles, and require any

- such returns to be verified in the prescribed manner ;
- (d) require persons owning, or having in their possession or under their control, any such horse or vehicle as aforesaid to give notice in the prescribed manner before disposing thereof, or allowing it to pass out of their possession or control ;
- (e) provide for prohibiting or restricting the carriage of goods of any class by road, and for prescribing the radius or distance within which goods or goods of any class may be carried by road ;
- (f) provide for the giving of directions with respect to the carriage of goods on any particular vehicles, or by any particular clearing house or depot ;
- (g) provide for the regulation of the priority in which goods are to be carried by road and vehicles are to be used for the purpose of road transport ;
- (h) require persons owning or having in their possession or under their control any such horse or vehicle as aforesaid to comply with any directions given by any person

specified in or duly authorised in pursuance of the order for the purpose requiring them to use the horse or vehicle for the conveyance of such goods at such time and by such route as may be specified in the directions ;

- (i) Prescribe the conditions on which, and the rates at which, horses or vehicles may be hired for the purpose of road transport and goods carried by road, and the conditions on which goods so carried or to be carried are to be loaded or discharged ;
- (j) make such other provisions in relation to road transport as appear to the Minister necessary or expedient.

(2) Any order under this regulation may be made so as to apply either generally to all horses and vehicles, or to horses or vehicles of any class, or to horses or vehicles belonging to any particular owner, and either generally throughout Great Britain or to any particular areas.

(3) The Minister may provide for the exercise and performance by any person, or body of persons, appointed by him for the purpose, of any powers conferred upon the Minister by this regulation.

(4) For the purpose of testing the accuracy of any return made to the Minister under this regulation, or of obtaining information in the case of failure to make a return or to give any prescribed notice, any person authorised in that behalf by the Minister may enter any premises belonging to or in the occupation of the person who has made or has failed to make the return, or on which the person so authorised has reason to believe that any horses or vehicles with respect to which a return has been required under this regulation are kept, and may carry out such inspections and examinations (including the inspection and examination of books) as he may consider necessary for testing the accuracy of the return or for obtaining such information.

(5) No individual return or part of a return made, and no information obtained, under this regulation, shall without lawful authority be published or disclosed by any person except for the purpose of prosecution under this regulation.

(6) If in any case the minister is of opinion that it is expedient to obtain information from any person in connection with any horses or vehicles, the Minister may, without making an order for the purpose, require or authorise any person on his behalf to require that person to furnish him or

specified in or duly authorised in pursuance of the order for the purpose requiring them to use the horse or vehicle for the conveyance of such goods at such time and by such route as may be specified in the directions ;

- (i) Prescribe the conditions on which, and the rates at which, horses or vehicles may be hired for the purpose of road transport and goods carried by road, and the conditions on which goods so carried or to be carried are to be loaded or discharged ;
- (j) make such other provisions in relation to road transport as appear to the Minister necessary or expedient.
- (2) Any order under this regulation may be made so as to apply either generally to all horses and vehicles, or to horses or vehicles of any class, or to horses or vehicles belonging to any particular owner, and either generally throughout Great Britain or to any particular areas.
- (3) The Minister may provide for the exercise and performance by any person, or body of persons, appointed by him for the purpose, of any powers conferred upon the Minister by this regulation.

(4) For the purpose of testing the accuracy of any return made to the Minister under this regulation, or of obtaining information in the case of failure to make a return or to give any prescribed notice, any person authorised in that behalf by the Minister may enter any premises belonging to or in the occupation of the person who has made or has failed to make the return, or on which the person so authorised has reason to believe that any horses or vehicles with respect to which a return has been required under this regulation are kept, and may carry out such inspections and examinations (including the inspection and examination of books) as he may consider necessary for testing the accuracy of the return or for obtaining such information.

(5) No individual return or part of a return made, and no information obtained, under this regulation, shall without lawful authority be published or disclosed by any person except for the purpose of prosecution under this regulation.

(6) If in any case the minister is of opinion that it is expedient to obtain information from any person in connection with any horses or vehicles, the Minister may, without making an order for the purpose, require or authorise any person on his behalf to require that person to furnish him or

any person so authorised with that information ; and where the Minister or any person so authorised so requires any information to be furnished, all the provisions of this regulation shall apply to information furnished and the furnishing of the information as they apply to returns made and the making of returns.

(7) In this regulation the expression "prescribed" means prescribed by an order made under this regulation, the expression "horse" includes "mule," and the expression "vehicle" includes vehicles of any description, whether propelled by mechanical power or otherwise and whether used for drawing other vehicles or otherwise.

5. Where with a view to preventing congestion of traffic on, or excessive damage to, public highways the Minister of Transport considers it is expedient to do so, he may by order regulate or provide for the regulation of transport on public highways, and may by such order provide for directions being given for prescribing the routes to be followed and restricting the types of vehicles to be used, and if any person affected by the order fails to comply with the provisions thereof or with any directions given thereunder he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

6. The Minister of Transport and any other Government department approved by His Majesty for the purpose, and any person duly authorised by a department on whom powers are conferred by or under this regulation, may grant to any person a licence to drive a motor-car during the period for which the Proclamation of Emergency is in force, and such licence shall have effect as if granted under the Motor Car Act, 1903.

7.—(1) The Minister of Transport may take possession, and may from time to time, as may be deemed expedient, relinquish and resume possession, of any harbour, dock, pier, railway, light railway or tramway, and of the plant belonging thereto, including any station for generating electricity for the purposes thereof, or of any part of such harbour, dock, pier, railway, light railway, tramway or plant, and may take possession of any plant without taking possession of the harbour, dock, pier, railway, light railway, or tramway itself, and may give directions as to the management and user of any harbour, dock, pier, railway, light railway, tramway or plant of which possession has been so taken as aforesaid.

(2) The directors and officers of any such harbour, dock, pier, railway, light railway or tramway, and every other person engaged in the management

thereof or of any part of plant thereof, shall comply with any directions given under this regulation.

(3) The Minister of Transport may provide for the exercise by any person or body of persons authorised by him of any powers conferred upon him by this regulation.

(4) If any person fails to comply with any directions of the Minister under this regulation, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

(5) For the purposes of this regulation the power of the Minister to take possession of a part of a railway or tramway shall be construed as including power to take over the running and management of any particular service on the railway or tramway.

8.—(1) Where the Minister of Transport is of opinion that it is expedient that this regulation should be applied to any canals, the Minister may by order apply this regulation, subject to any exceptions for which provision may be made in the order, either generally to all canals or to canals in any special area or to any special canal.

(2) Any canal to which this regulation is so applied shall, by virtue of the order, pass into the possession of the Minister as from the date of the order, or from any later date mentioned in the order, and the owner of every such canal and every person

concerned in the management or working thereof, and where the owner of the canal is a company, every director of the company, shall comply with the directions of the Minister as to the management and user of the canal, and if he fails to do so he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

(3) In this regulation the expression "canal" includes all buildings, barges, machinery and plant used in connection with the working of the canal.

(4) Where the Minister has taken possession of any canal, the Minister may by order prohibit persons, not being the owner of the canal, who own any barges used thereon, or any machinery or plant used in connection with the loading or unloading of any such barges, from disposing of any such barges, machinery or plant without the consent of the Minister or some person or body of persons acting on his behalf, and if any person acts in contravention of any such order he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

(5) The Minister shall have power by order to apply this regulation to undertakings of carriers by canal in like manner and with the like consequences as in the case of canals and for the purposes of this provision the expression "carrier by canal" means a person, not being an owner of a canal, who carries

on the business of transporting goods by canal, and the expression "undertaking" includes all buildings, barges, machinery and plant used by the owner thereof in connection with such business.

(6) It shall be lawful for the Admiralty, Army Council or Air Council, for the purpose of providing transport for any of the forces of the Crown, to take possession of vessels, including boats, barges or vessels of any description used for the transport of any commodities whatsoever upon any canal or navigable river.

9. Without prejudice to any other powers possessed by him, whether under these regulations or otherwise, the Minister of Transport may by order regulate the priority in which passengers or goods are to be carried by railway, light railway, tramway, or canal.

Such were the comprehensive powers invested in the Ministry of Transport. The actual emergency regulations issued by that Ministry were, however, remarkably restrained. They were contained in the following three instruments :

(1) THE ROAD TRANSPORT REGULATION (MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT) ORDER, 1926, DATED THE 1ST DAY OF MAY, 1926, MADE BY THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT UNDER THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS, 1926.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Emergency Regulations, 1926, made under the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the Minister of Transport hereby Orders as follows :—

1. Any person owning or having in his possession or under his control any horse or vehicle in use or capable of being used for the purpose of road transport shall comply with any directions given by any transport officer requiring him to use the horse or vehicle for the conveyance of such goods to such place at such time and by such route as may be specified in the direction.

2. In this Order the expression "transport officer" means any of the Road Commissioners mentioned in the Schedule to this Order, and any persons authorised in writing in that behalf by any such Road Commissioner.

3. Contraventions of this Order are summary offences against the Emergency Regulations, 1926, which render an offender liable on conviction to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding three months, or to a fine not exceeding £100, or to both imprisonment and fine, and to forfeiture to the Crown of any goods or

money in respect of which the offence was committed.

4. This Order shall, save in so far as it may be varied or revoked by a subsequent Order, have effect so long as the Proclamation under the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, in force at the date of this Order remains in force.

5. The Interpretation Act, 1889, shall apply to the interpretation of this Order in like manner as it applies to the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.

6. This Order may be cited as "The Road Transport Regulation (Ministry of Transport) Order, 1926."

Schedule.

NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ROAD COMMISSIONERS.

- Col. C. H. Bressey, C.B.E., F.S.I., Ministry of Transport, 7, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
 Col. W. S. Richmond, C.M.G., A.M.Inst.C.E., Ministry of Transport, 7, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
 Mr. R. S. Moon, M.I.M. & Cy.E., 81, St. Mary's Place, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
 Lt.-Col. H. T. Tudsbery, M.C., M.Inst.C.E., 12 St. John's Lane, Liverpool.

- Mr. W. H. Budgett, M.C., A.M.Inst.C.E., Ministry of Transport, 1, Park Place, Leeds.
 Mr. W. I. Tait, O.B.E., A.M.Inst.C.E., 8, Oxford Street, Nottingham.
 Mr. F. C. Cook, D.S.O., M.C., M.Inst.C.E., Nr 112, Newspaper House, 174, Corporation Street, Birmingham.
 Mr. W. C. Clemens, A.M.Inst.C.E., 12, 14 and 16, Hill's Road, Cambridge.
 Lt.-Col. J. F. Hawkins, O.B.E., Chaplain's House, Forbury Road, Reading.
 Col. S. Stallard, D.S.O., O.B.E., A.M.Inst.C.E., 25, Great George Street, Bristol.
 Mr. S. Evans, F.S.I., Dominions House, Queen Street, Cardiff.
 Mr. J. W. Peck, C.B., c/o C. M. Campbell, Esq., Board of Agriculture for Scotland, York Buildings, Queen Street, Edinburgh.
 Mr. C. Curtis Gray, M.Inst.C.E., 122, George Street, Edinburgh.
 Mr. C. H. Marshall, S.S.C., 97, Seagate, Dundee.
 Mr. G. Bennett Mitchell, M.B.E., D.L., 1, West Craibstone Street, Bon Accord Square, Aberdeen.
 Brig.-Gen. Macfarlane, C.B., D.S.O., Dunain Park, Inverness.

Sir H. Arthur Rose, D.S.O., 23, Ainslie Place,
Edinburgh.

Given under the Official Seal of the Minister
of Transport this 1st day of May, 1926.

J. R. BROOKE,

Secretary to the Ministry of Transport.

(2) THE ROAD TRANSPORT REQUISITION (MINISTRY
OF TRANSPORT ORDER, 1926, DATED THE
1ST DAY OF MAY, 1926, MADE BY THE
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT UNDER THE
EMERGENCY REGULATIONS, 1926.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him
by the Emergency Regulations, 1926, made under
the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, and of all other
powers enabling him in that behalf, the Minister
of Transport hereby Orders that, except under the
authority of the Minister of Transport, the follow-
ing Regulations shall be observed by all persons
concerned.

1. In this Order the expression "requisitioning
officer" means any of the following persons :—

- (a) The Quartermaster-General to the Forces ;
- (b) Any of the Road Commissioners mentioned
in the Schedule to this Order ;

(c) Any person authorised, in writing, by the
Minister of Transport, by the Quarter-
master-General to the Forces, or by any
of the said Commissioners to take posses-
sion of horses or vehicles to which this
Order applies.

2. The Minister of Transport requires all persons
owning or having in their possession or under their
control any horse or vehicle to which this Order
applies, when so required by any requisitioning
officer, to place the same at the disposal, absolutely
or by way of hire, and either for immediate or future
use as required, of that officer, who is hereby author-
ised to take possession of and use the same.

3. This Order shall apply to all horses and road
vehicles (whether horse-drawn or mechanically-
propelled or drawn) in use or capable of being used
for transport by road, except any horse or vehicle
used for Naval, Military or Air Force purposes,
or for Postal, Police, Fire Brigade or Ambulance
purposes, or for Medical or Veterinary purposes, or
used wholly or mainly for the purpose of agriculture.

4. Contraventions of this Order are summary
offences against the Emergency Regulations, 1926,
which render an offender liable on conviction to
imprisonment with or without hard labour for a

term not exceeding three months, or to a fine not exceeding £100, or to both such imprisonment and fine, and to forfeiture to the Crown of any goods or money in respect of which the offence was committed.

5. This Order shall, save in so far as it may be varied or revoked by a subsequent Order, have effect so long as the Proclamation under the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, in force at the date of this Order remains in force.

6. The Interpretation Act, 1889, shall apply to the interpretation of this Order in like manner as it applies to the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.

7. This Order may be cited as "The Road Transport Requisition (Ministry of Transport) Order, 1926."

Schedule.

[Here follow the names and addresses of Road Commissioners as in No. (1) above.]

Given under the Official Seal of the Minister of Transport this 1st day of May, 1926.

J. R. BROOKE,

Secretary to the Ministry of Transport.

(3) THE ROAD TRANSPORT REGULATION OF PRIORITIES (MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT) ORDER, 1926, DATED THE 1ST DAY OF MAY, 1926, MADE BY THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT UNDER THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS, 1926.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Emergency Regulations, 1926, made under the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the Minister of Transport hereby Orders as follows:—

1. If it shall appear to any of the Road Commissioners mentioned in the First Column of the Schedule to this Order that it is expedient that the priority in which goods are to be carried by road and vehicles are to be used for the purpose of road transport throughout the area set out in the Second Column of the said Schedule opposite to his name or in any smaller area forming part of that area should be regulated such Road Commissioner may by writing under his hand declare any such area to be a Scheduled Area for the purpose of this Order, and the expression "Scheduled Area" where used hereinafter in this Order means, unless the context otherwise requires, any area as to which such a declaration as aforesaid has been made.

2. Where under the provisions of this Order a Road Commissioner has declared an area to be a Scheduled Area he may from time to time by writing under his hand prescribe a list of commodities to which priority of conveyance by road is to be given within that Scheduled Area and may from time to time vary such list, and in this Order the expression "prescribed commodities" means in relation to any scheduled area the commodities for the time being included in the list in force in that area.

3. In any Scheduled Area no person owning or having in his control any vehicle used or capable of being used for the purpose of the conveyance of goods by road shall (except with the written permission of the Road Commissioner by virtue of whose declaration the area became a Scheduled Area or that of some person authorised by him in that behalf) use that vehicle or permit that vehicle to be used for the conveyance of goods other than prescribed commodities if and so long as any such commodity is offered to him for conveyance by road and he has not agreed with the person so offering such commodity for its conveyance by some other vehicle.

4. Where under the provisions of this Order

a Road Commissioner has declared any area to be a Scheduled Area or has prescribed or varied any list of prescribed commodities he shall cause such steps to be taken either by publication of notices in newspapers or by the exhibition of notices or copies of such declaration or list in Post Offices and Police Stations as he may think best adapted to bring the matter to the notice of persons concerned.

5. Contraventions of this Order are summary offences against the Emergency Regulations, 1926, which render an offender liable on conviction to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding three months, or to a fine not exceeding £100, or to both such imprisonment and fine, and to forfeiture to the Crown of any goods or money in respect of which the offence was committed.

6. This Order shall, save in so far as it may be varied or revoked by subsequent Order, have effect so long as the Proclamation under the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, in force at the date of this Order remains in force.

7. The Interpretation Act, 1889, shall apply to the interpretation of this Order in like manner as it applies to the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.

8. This Order may be cited as "The Road Transport Regulation of Priorities (Ministry of Transport) Order, 1926."

Schedule.

Names and Addresses of Road Commissioners.	Areas over which Road Commissioners have Jurisdiction.
Col. C. H. Bressey, C.B.E., F.S.I., Ministry of Transport, 7, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.	London Division and Home Counties Division, comprising the Counties of Essex, Hertford, London, Kent, Middlesex, Surrey and Sussex.
Col. W. S. Richmond, C.M.G., A.M.Inst.C.E., Ministry of Transport, 7, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.	
Mr. R. S. Moon, M.I.M. & Cy.E., 81, St. Mary's Place, Newcastle-on-Tyne.	Northern Division, comprising the Counties of Durham, Northumberland and Yorkshire (North Riding).
Lt.-Col. H. T. Tudbery, M.C., M.Inst.C.E., 12, St. John's Lane, Liverpool.	North-Western Division, comprising the Counties of Anglesey, Carnarvon, Cheshire, Cumberland, Denbigh, Flint, Lancashire, Merioneth, Montgomery and Westmorland.
Mr. W. H. Budgett, M.C., A.M.Inst.C.E., Ministry of Transport, 1, Park Place, Leeds.	North-Eastern Division, comprising the County of Yorkshire.
Mr. W. I. Tait, O.B.E., A.M.Inst.C.E., 8, Oxford Street, Nottingham.	North Midland Division, comprising the Counties of Derby, Huntingdon, Leicester, Lincoln, Northampton, Nottingham and Rutland.

Names and Addresses of Road Commissioners.	Areas over which Road Commissioners have Jurisdiction.
Mr. F. C. Cook, D.S.O., M.C., M.Inst.C.E., N.112, Newspaper House, 174, Corporation Street, Birmingham.	Midland Division, comprising the Counties of Hereford, Salop, Stafford, Warwick and Worcester.
Mr. W. C. Clemens, A.M.Inst. C.E., 12, 14 and 16, Hills Road, Cambridge.	Eastern Division, comprising the Counties of Bedford, Cambridge, Huntingdon, Norfolk and Suffolk.
Lt.-Col. J. F. Hawkins, O.B.E., Chaplain's House, Forbury Road, Reading.	South Midland Division, comprising the Counties of Berks, Bucks, Hants, Oxford, Wilts and the Isle of Wight.
Col. S. Stallard, D.S.O., O.B.E., A.M.Inst.C.E., 25, Great George Street, Bristol.	South-Western Division, comprising the Counties of Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucester and Somerset.
Mr. S. Evans, F.S.I., Dominions House, Queen Street, Cardiff.	South Wales Division, comprising the Counties of Brecknock, Cardigan, Carmarthen, Glamorgan, Monmouth, Pembroke and Radnor.
Mr. J. W. Peck, C.B., c/o C. M. Campbell, Esq., Board of Agriculture for Scotland, York Buildings, Queen Street, Edinburgh.	Midlothian, East Lothian, West Lothian and Berwick, Roxburgh, Peebles, Selkirk, Fifeshire (County Districts of Kirkcaldy and Dunfermline only), Orkney, Shetland, Clackmannan, Kinross, Stirling (Central and Eastern County Districts only).
Mr. C. Curtis Gray, M.Inst. C.E., 122, George Street, Edinburgh.	
Mr. C. H. Marshall, S.S.C., 97, Seagate, Dundee.	Forfar, Perthshire, Fifeshire (County Districts of Cupar and St. Andrews only).

136 *General Strikes and Road Transport*

Names and Addresses of Road Commissioners.	Areas over which Road Commissioners have Jurisdiction.
Mr. G. Bennett Mitchell, M.B.E., D.L., 1, West Craibstone Street, Bon Accord Square, Aberdeen.	Aberdeenshire, Banff, Kincardine, Elgin.
Brig.-General Macfarlane, C.B., D.S.O., Dunain Park, Inverness.	Inverness, Nairn, Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland, Caithness.
Sir H. Arthur Rose, D.S.O., 23, Ainslie Place, Edinburgh.	All the counties and county districts other than those scheduled above.

Given under the Official Seal of the Minister of Transport this 1st day of May, 1926.

J. R. BROOKE,

Secretary to the Ministry of Transport.

APPENDIX.

CIVIL COMMISSIONERS, STAFFS AND OFFICE ADDRESSES.
HEAD-QUARTERS.

The Rt. Hon. Sir W. MITCHELL-THOMSON, Bt., K.B.E., M.P., Chief Civil Commissioner.

A. B. LOWRY, C.B., Principal Chief Assistant.

C. F. ROUNDELL, C.B.E., Deputy Principal Chief Assistant.

Offices : 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

EASTERN DIVISION :

CAMBRIDGESHIRE, BEDS, HUNTS,
NORFOLK, SUFFOLK.*

Civil Commissioner - Major Sir PHILIP SASSOON, Bt., G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P.

Chief Assistant - W. D. BUSHELL.

Deputy Chief Assistant W. A. DEARMAN.

Coal Officer - H. FRANKLIN.

Finance Officer - W. ROBBS.

* See foot-note * on page 148.

- Food Officer - - R. J. BOYCE.
 Military Liaison Officer Lt.-Col. R. H. CARRINGTON, D.S.O.
 Police Liaison Officer - W. V. WEBB,
 Postal Representative - E. F. NUNNS.
 Railway Representatives A. B. COULTER ; W. THEOBALD.
 Road Commissioner - W. C. CLEMENS, A.M.Inst.C.E.
 Emergency Offices—12, Hills Road, Cambridge.
Telephone.—Cambridge 1797.

LONDON AND HOME COUNTIES DIVISION:

LONDON, MIDDLESEX, HERTS,
 ESSEX, KENT, SUSSEX, SURREY.*

- Civil Commissioner - Major W. COPE, M.P.
 Chief Assistant - - J. S. OXLEY, C.B.E.
 Deputy Chief Assistants J. J. SCOTT ; A. N. RUCKER.
 Coal Officers - - F. KNIGHT, London ; A. COUSINS, Home Counties.
 Finance Officer - - L. P. WALKER.
 Food Officer - - Hon. HORACE WOODHOUSE, C.B.E.

* See foot-note * on page 148.

- Military Liaison Officers Lt.-Col. F. W. BULLOCK MARSHAM, D.S.O., M.C. ; Major V. N. LOCKETT ; Capt. (Bt. Major) J. C. O. MARRIOTT, D.S.O., M.C. ; Bt. Major G. E. TOYNBEE, C.M.G., C.B.E.
 Police Liaison Officers - Sir LEONARD DUNNING ; Hon. TREVOR BIGHAM, C.B.
 Postal Representative - T. R. GARDINER.
 Railway Representatives R. BUXTON, M.Inst.T. ; F. P. KINSMAN ; R. E. LAMPITT ; P. SYDER.
 Road Commissioners - C. H. BRESSEY, C.B.E., F.S.I., London ; Col. W. S. RICHMOND, C.M.G., A.M.Inst.C.E., Home Counties.
 Canals - - - J. W. BLISS.
 Water Transport District Committee - W. J. McALISTER.
 Emergency Offices—Ministry of Health, S.W.1.
Telephone.—Victoria 9800.
 (Night)—Victoria 9817.

DOCKS AREA, LONDON.

- Special Civil Commissioner - - - Lt.-Col. J. T. C. MOORE-BRABAZON, M.C., M.P.
- Chief Assistant - - - Sir ALEXANDER ROGER.
- Naval Liaison Officer - Capt. HENDERSON, R.N.
- Assistant Naval Liaison Officer - - - Commander BUNBURY, R.N.
- Board of Trade Liaison Officer - - - T. ST. QUINTIN HILL.
- Police Liaison Officer - Major MARRIAGE.
- Assistant Police Liaison Officer - - - Major DANIELL.
- Military Liaison Officer Capt. MITCHELL.
- Ministry of Transport Liaison Officer - G. F. REY.

MIDLAND DIVISION :

WARWICKSHIRE, WORCESTERSHIRE,
HEREFORDSHIRE, SALOP, STAFFORDSHIRE.*

- Civil Commissioner - Lt.-Col. Hon. G. F. STANLEY, C.M.G., M.P.

* See foot-note * on page 148.

- Chief Assistant - - - W. P. ELIAS.
- Deputy Chief Assistant A. BROADLEY.
- Coal Officer - - - R. E. LEDBURY, M.B.E.
- Finance Officer - - - O. E. B. BRIGDEN.
- Food Officer - - - T. PRITCHETT, O.B.E.
- Military Liaison Officers Lt.-Col. A. J. BANNERMAN, D.S.O. ; Major W. O. BROWNE ; Capt. J. M. L. GLOVER.
- Police Liaison Officer - C. C. H. MORIARTY, O.B.E.
- Postal Representative - J. SCOTT, M.B.E.
- Railway Representatives T. H. SHIPLEY ; J. W. ENSER.
- Road Commissioner - F. C. COOK, D.S.O., M.C., M.Inst.C.E.
- Canals - - - A. J. BUTLER.
- Emergency Offices—Newspaper House, 174, Corporation Street, Birmingham.
Telephone.—Birmingham, Cent. 2296.
- NORTH-EASTERN DIVISION :
- YORKSHIRE.*
- Civil Commissioner - Capt. D. H. HACKING, O.B.E., M.P.

* See foot-note * on page 148.

- Chief Assistant - - Col. A. G. HAYWARD,
M.C.
- Deputy Chief Assistant E. C. BLIGHT.
- Coal Officer - - A. W. MILLS.
- Finance Officer - - H. D. ROBERTS.
- Food Officer - - W. CARBY HALL, C.B.E.
- Military Liaison Officers Major J. E. BLAKISTON-
HOUSTON, D.S.O. ;
Major A. C. ALLEN,
D.S.O.
- Police Liaison Officer - C. de C. PARRY, C.B.E.
- Postal Representative - T. P. HOGBINS, C.B.E.
- Railway Representatives S. T. BURGOYNE ; J. V.
PARTINGTON.
- Road Commissioner - W. H. BUDGETT, M.C.,
A.M.Inst.C.E.
- Canals - - - Sir JOHN EAGLESOME,
K.C.M.G.
- Water Transport Dis-
trict Committee - F. W. PRICKETT.
- Emergency Offices—13, King Street, Leeds.
- Telephone—Leeds 29001.*

NORTHERN DIVISION :

NORTHUMBERLAND, DURHAM.*

- Civil Commissioner - Sir KINGSLEY WOOD, M.P.
- Chief Assistant - - N. B. BATTERBURY.
- Deputy Chief Assistant E. F. DAVIS.
- Coal Officer - - G. C. ROBINSON.
- Finance Officer - - H. W. MAGRATH, M.C.
- Food Officer - - Maj.-Gen. Sir R. A. KERR
MONTGOMERY,
K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.
- Military Liaison Officer Maj. W. A. T. BARSTOW,
D.S.O., M.C.
- Police Liaison Officer - Dr. J. B. WRIGHT, C.B.E.,
LL.D.
- Postal Representative - C. CREIGHTON.
- Railway Representative J. L. NAISBY.
- Road Commissioner - R. S. MOON,
M.I.M. & Cy.E.
- Water Transport Dis-
trict Committee - T. E. BROWN.
- Emergency Offices—81, St. Mary's Place, New-
castle-on-Tyne.
- Telephone—Newcastle, Cent. 5814.*

*See foot-note * on page 148.

NORTH MIDLAND DIVISION :

NOTTS, LINCOLNSHIRE, RUTLAND,
LEICESTERSHIRE, NORTHANTS,
DERBYSHIRE.*

- Civil Commissioner - Capt. H. DOUGLAS KING,
C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P.
- Chief Assistant - - W. J. T. TURTON, O.B.E.
Deputy Chief Assistant C. S. PETHERAM, M.C.
Coal Officer - - R. H. CASE.
Finance Officer - - D. F. BELCHAMBER, O.B.E.
Food Officer - - W. O. MACARTHUR.
Military Liaison Officer Major J. F. THOMSON,
D.S.O.
Police Liaison Officer - Col. F. BROOK, D.S.O.,
M.C.
Postal Representative - E. J. GAYES.
Railway Representatives G. DAY ; F. E. BAXENDALL.
Road Commissioner - W. I. TAIT, O.B.E.,
A.M.Inst.C.E.
Canals - - - Col. F. RAYNER, D.S.O.

Emergency Offices—28A, Regent Street, Not-
tingham.

Telephone—Nottingham 2676.

* See foot-note * on page 148.

NORTH-WESTERN DIVISION :

LANCASHIRE, CHESHIRE, DENBIGH-
SHIRE, MONTGOMERYSHIRE, MER-
IONETH, CARNARVONSHIRE, ANGLESEY,
FLINTSHIRE, CUMBERLAND, WESTMOR-
LAND.*

- Civil Commissioner - Major G. HENNESSY,
O.B.E., M.P.
- Chief Assistant - - G. R. SNOWDEN.
Deputy Chief Assistant K. W. GRANT.
Coal Officers - - J. E. KINLEY ; Capt. R. S.
PATTEN (North Wales).
Finance Officer - - J. ORCHARD.
Food Officers - - Sir ARNOLD RUSHTON ;
J. R. HUGHES, C.B.E.
(North Wales).
Military Liaison Officer Capt. W. A. HANNAY,
A.F.C.
Police Liaison Officer - F. CALDWELL, C.B.E.,
M.V.O.
Postal Representative - W. M. SIMPSON.
Railway Representatives S. B. CARTER ; J. A.
HARPER ; P. S. LUDLAM.

* See foot-note * on page 148.

Road Commissioner - Lt.-Col. H. T. TUDSBURY,
M.C., M.I.C.E.

Canals - - - W. A. M'GRATH.

Water Transport Dis-
trict Committee - E. COOK.

Emergency Offices—12, St. John's Lane, Liver-
pool.

Telephone—Royal 4757.

SOUTH MIDLAND DIVISION:

BERKS, OXFORDSHIRE, BUCKS, HANTS,
ISLE OF WIGHT, WILTS.*

Civil Commissioner - Major Rt. Hon. Earl
WINTERTON, M.P.

Chief Assistant - - O. J. LLEWELLYN.

Deputy Chief Assistant C. R. KERWOOD.

Coal Officer - - E. TALBOT.

Finance Officer - - G. G. H. STONE.

Food Officer - - E. W. J. ARMAN, O.B.E.

Military Liaison Officers Major V. J. GREENWOOD,
M.C. ; Major H. ST.
G. HAMERSLEY, D.S.O.,
R.A.S.C. ; Major A.
W. JOHNS ; Lt.-Col.
P. L. W. POWELL,
C.B.E., D.S.O.

* See foot-note * on page 148.

Police Liaison Officer - T. A. BURROWS.

Postal Representative - W. W. GRIERSON.

Railway Representatives E. P. C. CAMBRIDGE ;
H. RUFFELL ; P. NUNN ;
W. V. WHITE.

Road Commissioner - Lt.-Col. J. F. HAWKINS,
O.B.E.

Emergency Offices—Chaplain's House, Forbury
Road, Reading.

Telephone—Reading 1946.

SOUTH WALES DIVISION:

GLAMORGAN, CARMARTHEN,
PEMBROKE, CARDIGAN, RADNOR,
BRECON, MONMOUTHSHIRE.*

Civil Commissioner - The Earl of CLARENDON.

Chief Assistant - - JAMES EVANS.

Deputy Chief Assistant J. OWAIN EVANS, C.B.E.

Coal Officer - - FINLAY A. GIBSON.

Finance Officer - - W. A. AYTON.

Food Officer - - Sir THOMAS JONES, K.B.E.

Military Liaison Officer Major A. H. EVANS-
GWYNNE, D.S.O.

Police Liaison Officer - J. A. WILSON, O.B.E.

Postal Representative - G. N. MERREFIELD.

* See foot-note * on page 148.

Railway Representatives A. T. ROWLAND ; J. M
IRWIN.

Road Commissioner - SAM. EVANS, F.S.I.

Water Transport Dis-
trict Committee - W. H. BECKINGHAM.
Emergency Offices—Dominions House, Queen
Street, Cardiff.
Telephone—Cardiff 2583.

SOUTH-WESTERN DIVISION:

GLOUCESTERSHIRE, SOMERSET,
DORSET, DEVON, CORNWALL.*

Civil Commissioner - Rt. Hon. Earl STANHOPE,
D.S.O., M.C.

* The following local authorities are not in the Divisions in which
the greater part of their counties are included, but in the Divisions
named.

Middlesbrough C.B., Redcar B., Richmond B., Thornaby-on-
Tees B., Eston U.D., Guisborough U.D., Hinderwell U.D.,
Loftus U.D., Saltburn-by-the-Sea U.D., Skelton and Brotton U.D.,
Croft R.D., Guisborough R.D., Middlesbrough R.D., Reeth
R.D., Richmond R.D., Startforth R.D., Stokesley R.D. - -

NORTHERN DIVISION.

Glossop B., New Mills U.D., Chirbury R.D., Glossop Dale R.D. -
NORTH-WESTERN DIVISION

Campden R.D., Crick R.D., Malpas R.D., Marston Sicca R.D.,
Pebworth R.D., Sudbury R.D. - - - MIDLAND DIVISION.

Farnborough R.D. - - - SOUTH MIDLAND DIVISION

Old Fletton U.D., Whittlesey U.D., Mayfield R.D., Monks Kirby
R.D., Norman Cross R.D., Thorney R.D., Whittlesey R.D.

NORTH MIDLAND DIVISION.

Bredwardine R.D., Teme R.D., Whitchurch R.D. (Hereford) - -

SOUTH WALES DIVISION.

Chief Assistants - - R. H. G. DUFF ; H. K.
NISBET, O.B.E.

Deputy Chief Assistant J. TOPPING.

Coal Officer - - R. A. ROLFE.

Finance Officer - - W. WYNNE-GRIFFITH.

Food Officer - - Lt.-Col. E. F. STRANGE,
C.B.E.

Military Liaison Officers Major J. BRADSTOCK, M.C. ;
Major E. C. PINDER ;
Major T. E. G. SWAYNE ;
Capt. F. M. TURNER.

Police Liaison Officer - Capt. D. GRANVILLE,
M.V.O., O.B.E.

Postal Representative - W. PUGH.

Railway Representatives H. S. H. HERBERT ; E.
CROFTS ; W. T. VENTON.

Road Commissioner - Lt.-Col. S. STALLARD,
D.S.O., O.B.E.,
A.M.Inst.C.E.

Canals - - - E. MANNING LEWIS.

Water Transport Dis-
trict Committee - M. A. ROBINSON.

Emergency Offices—3, Unity Street, Bristol.


Telephone—Bristol 6568.

SCOTTISH EMERGENCY
ORGANISATION.Minister in Charge: The Right Hon. the LORD
ADVOCATE, K.C., M.P.Scottish Office Head-quarters: York Buildings,
Queen Street, Edinburgh.*Telephone*: Edinburgh Central 9340.

District Commissioner.	Head-quarters.	Area of the District.
J. W. Peck, C.B.	York Buildings, Queen Street, Edinburgh.	Midlothian, East Lothian, West Lothian, Berwick, Roxburgh, Peebles, Selkirk, Fifeshire (County Districts of Kirkcaldy and Dunfermline only), Orkney, Shetland, Clackmannan, Kinross, Stirling (Central and Eastern County Districts only).
C. H. Marshall, S.S.C.	The Custom House, Dock Street, Dundee.	Forfar, Perthshire, Fifeshire (County Districts of Cupar and St. Andrews only).
G. Bennett Mitchell, M.B.E., D.L.	1, West Craibstone Street, Bon Accord Square, Aberdeen.	Aberdeenshire, Banff, Kincardine, Elgin.

SCOTTISH EMERGENCY
ORGANISATION—*continued.*

District Commissioner.	Head-quarters.	Area of the District.
General D. A. Macfarlane, C.B., D.S.O.	Board of Agriculture's Office, 59, Academy Street, Inverness.	Inverness, Nairn, Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland, Caithness.
Sir H. Arthur Rose, D.S.O.	Scottish Office, 250, St. Vincent Street, Glasgow, C.2.	All the counties and county districts other than those scheduled above.



INSTITUTE

REFERENCE

1850

